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WOODROW WILSON'S FOURTEEN POINTS 100 YEARS ON: RETHINKING THE LIBERAL WORLD ORDER

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INTRODUCTION

On January 8, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson appeared before Congress to present his now famous *Fourteen Points* — a draft peace plan that was supposed to put an end to the First World War and prevent future conflicts. The document set out the basic principles by which humankind has attempted to live ever since. Unfortunately, while most of these points were accepted and even put into practice, they did not keep the world from wars, conflicts, global inequality and uneven development.

Wilson's points did not play out as planned for several reasons. The United States never became a member of the League of Nations due to internal political disagreements between the President and Congress (the executive and legislative powers in the United States continue to have fallings out to this day). Soviet Russia and Germany were not initially accepted into the League of Nations, which made this “world organization” insufficiently global in practice. Excluding these powerful players from the negotiations ultimately led to a new major conflict. This is a lesson for all humanity, one that is more relevant today than ever before.

The situation in early 2018 is in many respects similar to the history of 1918. Traditional players are becoming weaker, while some are disappearing into the past. Still others are now refusing to play by the old rules. The growing propensity toward conflict prevents cooperation in resolving common issues and achieving the goals of global development. Russia is seen as a constant threat, and attempts are being made to push the country out of the institutions of global governance. Geopolitical upheavals and threats makes us search for new principles of the world order that will make global politics at least slightly more manageable. A century after the Fourteen Points, we are attempting to rethink these principles through the prism of the fundamental changes taking place in the world today.

Technological, political, economic and social change is pushing us to take a fresh look at the Fourteen Points. The obvious inconsistency between the principles of self-determination of nations and territorial integrity continues to cause conflicts, not to the least the current conflict between Russia and the West. The communication revolution was supposed to make diplomacy truly

transparent and open, but the most important international decisions are still made behind closed doors. The United Nations (UN) has ceased to function in areas where there is a hint of conflicting interests among the major powers. Not only is the world far from free trade, the leaders of some countries are running and winning on protectionist platforms. Ongoing disputes concerning sovereignty over maritime domains threaten freedom of navigation. Regional arms races and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among state and non-state actors make a mockery of Wilson's call to reduce national armaments to the lowest possible level to ensure national security.

Almost every country in the world recognizes the importance of the principles set forth in the Fourteen Points. Some do not accept the "liberal" world order as a concept, seeing it as an extension of the United States' aspirations for global dominance, although they do recognize the universal significance of the values that this concept embodies. Openness, rationality and normativity — these are the philosophical achievements of this (still intact) world order. These three foundations of the unofficial global treaty were intended to create a balance between the universality of human existence and the uniqueness of every person.

However, the new reality means that the treaty has to be rethought. Are the numerous non-state actors equal subjects of the world order as states? How will the fourth industrial revolution change approaches to free trade and economic integration? Can national security be extended to include cyberspace? In this report, we attempt to address these issues and the answers will allow us to move toward a vision of the world order in the 21st century that is capable of ensuring the harmonious development of the global system, taking regional specifics into account and preserving the common heritage of humankind.

In the main part of this paper, Andrey Kortunov discusses the principles presented by Wilson that have best stood the test of time and how they can be applied today. This is followed by individual essays on each of the Fourteen Points in which the authors rethink the significance of the foundations of the world order, from self-determination to cybersecurity and arms reduction in a new and rapidly changing world.



ANDREY **KORTUNOV**

SEVEN DEBATES OVER
THE FOURTEEN POINTS

In his analysis of Wilsonianism, Immanuel Wallerstein, the eminent 20th-century analyst of world systems, draws attention to its following features: “Wilsonianism was based on classical liberal presuppositions. It was universalist, claiming that its precepts applied equally everywhere. It assumed that everyone acted on the basis of rational self-interest and that therefore everyone in the long run was reasonable. Hence peaceful and reformist practice was plausible. It placed great emphasis on legality and on form.” Wallerstein identifies three fundamental principles of Wilsonianism: universalism (openness), rationalism and legal determinism (normativity).

One can agree with Wallerstein in his appraisal of Woodrow Wilson’s ideas as highly traditional and even somehow “old fashioned” for Western political thought. For Wallerstein, the main merit and innovation of Wilsonianism is that the traditional foundations of liberalism are applicable not only to individuals within a state, but also to the state itself. He thus brought the classical liberal construction to its logical conclusion. After the Fourteen Points were presented to the world, all the followers of the Wilsonian tradition had to do was to clarify, specify and apply Wilson’s general approaches to specific situations, which is precisely what they did for the better part of the previous century.

On the other hand, the Soviet (and then the Russian) tradition of analyzing the Fourteen Points focuses not so much on the elements of continuity as it does on the what is innovative about the document. Wilson’s ideology is associated with the dawn of Pax Americana, and the Fourteen Points are seen as Washington’s first bid for global leadership in the 20th century. The American challenge was addressed both to the traditional diplomacy of the great European powers and, albeit to a lesser degree, to Lenin’s revolutionary foreign policy doctrine of the Decree on Peace. The rise and fall of Wilsonianism and the liberal world order was thus associated with the rise and fall of American hegemony. This also determines the attitude to the future of the liberal world order: the post-American world should by definition be a post-liberal and post-Wilsonian world.

Let us have a look at just how justified each of these approaches is.

WILSONIANISM: THE RATIONALE FOR PAX AMERICANA?

There is no doubt that Wilson's Fourteen Points were in line with the strategic interests of the United States following the First World War. It is no coincidence that the leaders of Great Britain and France reacted to the Fourteen Points unenthusiastically, to put it mildly. Incidentally, Wilson is credited with coining the famous phrase "America First!" which he used during his 1916 election campaign, precisely 100 years before Donald Trump successfully did the same. Throughout his life, Wilson was a consistent American nationalist, and he felt the nationalist wave in Europe. This is why he tries in his Fourteen Points to reconcile his own deeply held universalism with the growing particularism in Europe¹. The universalism of the Fourteen Points was intended for the victors of the First World War, while particularism was the lot of the vanquished. But Wilson's universalism implied additional responsibilities as well as additional rights — first and foremost, to ensure the existence of what would later be generally referred to as global commons.

There is a good deal of evidence to suggest that Wilson was both disappointed and irritated when he came up against the short-sighted and selfish position of his European allies. However, the central idea of Wilson's foreign policy program (the creation of the League of Nations) was ultimately rejected in Washington, and not in the capitals of the great European powers. Instead of setting about the construction of a new world order, the United States preferred to sit in isolation for nearly two decades. This circumstance alone makes one question the close association often drawn between the liberal world order of the 20th century and U.S. foreign policy.

The United States no doubt played a crucial role in the creation of the modern system of international relations and institutions in the second half of the 20th century. However, the principles of this system were laid long before Wilson's speech and the United States' entry into the circle of great powers. Bold attempts to reconcile universalism and particularism were made during the Enlightenment in Europe. Many of the ideas voiced by Woodrow Wilson in his Fourteen Points (especially those concerning openness) were very much in tune with the rhetoric of the British strategies of the Victorian and Edwardian periods. And the principle of openness of the international system had gained a lot of support in Germany by the beginning of the 20th century.

¹ *This, by the way, is the fundamental difference between Wilson's "moderate" universalism and the radical universalism of the Bolsheviks. Bolshevik universalism did not attempt to reconcile itself with national particularism, declaring war on it instead.*

In the most general terms, Wilson's worldview was in tune with the sentiments felt by any rising power that required greater access to resources and opportunities already enjoyed by others².

And, on the contrary, the liberal world order was — and still is — seen as a threat in countries whose geopolitical heyday is behind them and who are struggling to preserve the positions they had acquired in the international system. This general pattern needs to be elaborated with regard to specific situations: the same country can both be in favor and against individual dimensions of the liberal world order.

Thus, the Pax Americana of the second half of the 20th century can be seen as an individual case of the selective use of liberal principles by a country on the rise. The United States took maximum advantage of the opportunities that came with American hegemony in the liberal space after the Second World War. However, when implementing their foreign policy strategy, the U.S. leaders had no problems neglecting rationality, normativity and openness whenever they saw fit.

Now the relative weight of the United States is in decline, all the more so because not all Americans fit into the framework of the liberal world order that President Woodrow Wilson envisioned 100 years ago. It is unlikely that Wilson would be impressed by the protectionist initiatives of Donald Trump, the focus on bilateral trade deals to the detriment of multilateral negotiations, or the announcement that the United States is withdrawing from UNESCO. The fragile balance between universalism and particularism has shifted decisively toward the latter, and a significant portion of American society clearly supports this. This further confirms the obvious conclusion that

American hegemony and the liberal world order are historically interconnected phenomena, but by no means are they synonymous.

WILSONIANISM: A CONTINUATION OF LIBERAL IDEOLOGY?

If the traditional Soviet understanding of Wilson's Fourteen Points as a declaration of American imperialism needs refinement, then the widespread Western view that Wilsonianism and the accompanying world order are inseparable from liberal ideology needs to be clarified. The relationship between the liberal world order and liberalism as a political ideology is not always clear cut. Historically, the foundation of this world order was indeed created primarily by liberal Western democracies. These countries aside, there simply was no one else who could be at the table discussing the Fourteen Points after the

² Interestingly, the Fourteen Points were not banned in Soviet Russia. On the contrary, they were widely published. Despite the incompatible positions, Wilson's universalism could not but impress the universalist Bolsheviks.

First World War — with the possible exception of communist Russia.

But the creation clearly outgrew its creators: having become more or less universal, the liberal world order stopped being the exclusive property of the West. To a greater or lesser extent, its principles were adopted by non-liberal regimes — from Pinochet-era Chile to Deng Xiaoping's China . The overwhelming majority of non-Western countries (India, Turkey, Brazil, Indonesia, Vietnam and Nigeria) are still trying hard to integrate themselves into this world order, rightly believing that in the framework of this system they are in receipt of the most favorable conditions for their economic development.

The fourth wave of democratization, on which high hopes were pinned at the turn of the 21st century, did not assert the supremacy of liberal values in East Asia, much less in the Middle East. Russia and the majority of the other post-Soviet states never turned into mature liberal democracies of the Western mould. On the contrary, they are moving further and further away from it in their political evolution. However, as far as one can tell, the partial or complete denial of liberal values is not accompanied with the categorical rejection of the liberal world order.

It is possible that, for Woodrow Wilson, the Fourteen Points were indeed the product of his deeply held convictions about how human society should be arranged from top to bottom, and that he did not separate American liberalism from its international incarnation. In reality, however, the liberal world order turned out to be broader in scope, more attractive and more global than liberalism as a political ideology. For the simple reason that it is not so much an ideological platform as it is a technical instrument for organizing the global economic and, to some extent, political space.

As a technical instrument, the liberal world order mutatis mutandis is acceptable not only for the Anglo-Saxon world, but also for the social democratic world of continental Europe, the authoritarian regimes of East Asia and even the theocratic Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf.

New participants in the system always require large-scale reforms to its internal structure — access to key decisions, restructuring existing institutions, changing priorities, etc. At the very least, we are talking about changing the balance of power in those international structures that to one extent or another govern the world (the UN, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, etc.). This is natural: after all, the new participants in the system were not part of its creation in the middle of the last century. New players also aspire to create parallel, duplicative structures for managing the world order, especially when the old structures are not ready to change.

On the other hand, it is common for almost all new players to demand that the old ones acknowledge “pluralism of values,” that is, to finally sever the implied connection between

liberalism as a political ideology and liberalism as the basis of the world order. For those new players, the emphasis on promoting political democratization on a global scale is giving way to the priority of sustainable socioeconomic development around the world. Of course, new players also demonstrate their own brand of particularism, hence not only the constant references to their own civilizational and cultural uniqueness, but also the habitual, though sometimes hypocritical, focus on sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

In any event, we are still talking about reform and not attempts to completely destroy the old and create a new (alternative) post-liberal world order. If circumstances align in a favorable way, then pawns could transform into queens. But the rules of the game are changing at a very slow pace, even more evident in our dynamic age. A typical example is the gradual transition of the global economic agenda from the G7/G8 format to the G20: the number of participants may have expanded, but the general principles of the group's work are basically the same. Consequently, the crisis of liberalism does not necessarily mean the concomitant crisis of the liberal world order. In this sense, Wilsonianism, albeit in a significantly modified form, continues to be relevant in the post-liberal world.

WILSONIANISM: A MANIFESTO OF ECONOMIC DETERMINISM?

At the heart of Woodrow Wilson's views on world politics lay the principle of rationality — as it was understood then by the well-educated white elite of the United States in the light of American history, American values, U.S. foreign policy record and American interests. The main role in the international system that was supposed to be created after the suicidal passions and destructive madness of the First World War should have been played exclusively by comprehensible, quantifiable and predictable factors. In the ideal world of Woodrow Wilson, foreign policy is not determined by the mystical revelations of a religious prophet, nor by the whims of an all-powerful despot, nor by the mythologemes of the national mission, which are precisely what led to the unprecedented catastrophe of 1914-1918.

Rational foreign policy, according to Wilson, is a common denominator of numerous and multidirectional group interests — political, economic, social and regional — which together form the national interests of a country. Although this rationalism did come from Wilson's political practice in the United States, its origins can be found in the very same European Enlightenment of the 18th century. Incidentally, it is this feature of Wilson's political ideology that separated his version of the world order from the Bolsheviks' more than anything else. While the president of the United States was looking to balance group interests in international relations, the Russian revolutionaries sought to present international relations after 1917 as a manifestation of the irreconcilable struggle between two

social antagonists — the global bourgeoisie and the global proletariat.

It is well known that, in the early 20th century, rationalism was often perceived as a hierarchy of individual, group and national economic interests. This kind of economic determinism was characteristic of both liberal thought and the Marxist paradigm that opposes it.

President Wilson can probably be blamed for harbouring the naïve hope that removing trade barriers and restrictions would not only allow the United States to enter markets that had previously been closed to it, but would also lead to a rationalization of world politics, pushing political, national, ethnic, regional and other contradictions to the background. The events that followed clearly demonstrated just how wrong this view was. The Second World War was not based on the clash of economic interests, neither was the Cold War. Rather, an irreconcilable ideological conflict was at the root of both. The presumably pragmatic elites were dethroned by, or joined the ranks of, political populism. Rapid economic growth in the second half of the 20th century and the accompanying lowering of barriers did not lead to universal peace and security. And the beginning of the 21st century was marked by a growth in the significance of non-economic factors in international relations that hardly anyone could have predicted — from radical nationalism to religious fundamentalism.

Nevertheless, one hundred years after the Fourteen Points, the economic foundation of global politics has still not been destroyed. Today, the inextricable link between development and security is even more evident than it was in 1918, and problems of incomplete socioeconomic modernization are often behind the unexpected bursts of irrationality and archaism in the foreign policies of individual states.

We perceive economic rationality differently than our ancestors did one hundred years ago. However, the economic basis of rationality has not gone anywhere and is unlikely to go anywhere in the foreseeable future.

But the coalitions of those who are for and those who are against global universalism have changed, and in a very significant way. The old Marxist theory that “the workers have no fatherland” had not panned out by the outbreak of the First World War. Today, it is the blue collar workers who form the main social base of nationalism and right-wing populism. On the other hand, the attitude of business to globalization is more than ambiguous and is determined by economic sector, size, geographical location and a number of other factors. An even more complex alignment of forces is developing in civil society.

After a certain period of disorder and indecision, stable alliances of contemporary Wilsonianists and anti-Wilsonianists may appear. However, it is extremely difficult to imagine a single global rupture given the unprecedented pluralism of interests, aspirations and identities at the group and individual levels. In our opinion, we are more likely to see a scenario

in which situational alliances are constantly readjusted around a single problem. We will all support Wilsonianism in certain situations and oppose it in others.

If we were to try and identify the main social base of the liberal world order, then it would obviously be the global middle class³. The middle class, especially the part of the middle class that is associated with the new economy, sees more opportunities than threats in liberal globalization.

Thus, the erosion of the middle class in the West that we have been witnessing for several decades now, should be regarded as one of the most serious long-term threats to Wilsonian ideas.

WILSONIANISM: MAKING INTERNATIONAL LAW ABSOLUTE?

Like many U.S. presidents, Woodrow Wilson received legal education, practicing law at the start of his career. It is thus unsurprising that the Fourteen Points were to have a legal and regulatory basis for the world order. The ideal of Wilsonianism is to have universal norms and standards for all players. Norms can be mandatory or voluntary, fixed in contracts or based on precedent. They can be enforced by international organizations, multilateral regimes or directly in relations among individual states. But norms have to exist, and they have to be the same for everyone. There should be no games without rules or different sets of rules for individual regions. Wilson went even further. He was also deeply involved in the development of an institutional basis for the new world order — the League of Nations. The attack on the plans of the 28th President of the United States came from his fellow countrymen on Capitol Hill, who refused to share even a portion of the United States' sovereignty with a little-understood international organization. Since then, the struggle for the rule of law in global politics has had mixed success.

There has been a progressive decline in manageability of the global system since the end of the Cold War. The decline of international organizations (starting with the United Nations, but also the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the G7 and other basic liberal instruments of global governance), the erosion of the fundamental principles of international public law, the increase in the number of armed conflicts and the inability of the global community to deal with them. All this is seen as a sign that there are deep problems in the modern world order — problems that cannot, and probably will not, be solved within the framework of the liberal paradigm.

However, it would hardly be correct to assert categorically that instability, violence and an-

³ We are talking, of course, about a middle class that is not dependent on the state.

archy are growing steadily in the modern world. The tendencies of modern world development are contradictory to say the least. For example, the pace of nuclear proliferation has not sped up in recent decades, but has in fact slowed down. On the whole, there has been a decline in the number of wars being fought around the world (including civil wars) since the turn of the century. At the same time, the intensity of these conflicts has increased.

In any case, the second decade of the 21st century does not appear to be fundamentally more dangerous or conflict-ridden than many of the preceding decades in world history.

Similarly, the stability of the modern system of international law cannot be overestimated. Of course, the norms of this law are broken from time to time, including by leading Western powers. But they were circumvented before as well.

Nevertheless, the current system of legal regulation of global politics, economics and finance is, on the whole, superior and more effective than it was 20 — and certainly 50 — years ago.

There are no significant forces in the world today that would deny the system of international legal norms that has developed over the past one hundred years in principle. Disputes about how to interpret legal norms and the direction in which they should develop will naturally continue, but rejecting legal universalism is out of the question. Nothing suggests that the global legal space will split in the near future regional or bloc-based, “Western” and “non-Western,” “liberal” and “post-liberal” international legal systems. They are just as likely to appear as a new, post-liberal multiplication table or post-liberal higher mathematics.

What is more, over the past decades, many areas that were once solely the subject of domestic legislation, or were not regulated at all, have become the subject of international legal regulation. In this sense, we can state that Wilsonianism is still relevant, although Woodrow Wilson’s hopes for the unconditional supremacy of legal norms in global politics are still far from being implemented in practice.

WILSONIANISM: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE “GOLDEN BILLION”?

The principles of openness and universalism are the most important basis of the Fourteen Points and all subsequent projects of the liberal world order. Wilson’s political philosophy was unequivocally and unambiguously against isolation, protectionism, closed spheres of influence and any other forms of limiting international cooperation. If Woodrow Wilson were alive today, he would undoubtedly be one of the prophets and leaders of globalization. After all, the liberal world order proceeds from the premise that global governability is not only desirable, but is also achievable in practice, and that increasing the level of govern-

ability of the global system meets the fundamental interests of all responsible participants in this system. That is, the advantages of an open international system are directly derived from the rationality of all its participants.

Now the principle of openness has come under fierce criticism from almost all directions: in developed countries, developing countries, Europe and the United States; from political populists and high-brow intellectuals, right- and left-wing radicals, nationalist and environmentalist groups. Protectionist, nationalist and anti-globalist sentiment is growing. Brexit referendum and the unexpected victory of Donald Trump in the United States, the apparent strengthening of right-wing radicals in continental Europe — all this can be seen as links in a single chain.

Critics of an open world order argue that, given the uneven development of the modern world, the very principles of openness and universalism inevitably consolidate the privileged position that the golden billion enjoys in relation to the rest of the world.

And this goes for both economic and socio-cultural specifics, as the leaders impose their goals, values, expectations and way of life onto individuals, social groups, states and entire continents. Thus, Woodrow Wilson and his successors are seen as supporters of global unification and enemies of individuality and group identity.

Are these accusations justified? The conflict between universalism and individuality is unsubstantiated if universalism is understood as a set of common (universal) laws, rules, hierarchies and models of interaction among the individual elements of the system. No system — biological or social — can exist without such a set of laws, since they make up its structure. Applied to contemporary international relations, the function of a structure is carried out by the existing universal norms of international law, established regimes and traditions, and the network of bilateral and multilateral international relations and regional and global organizations headed by the United Nations.

It is another matter entirely if universalism is understood as the global unification of *modus vivendi* and the system of normative precepts. That is, if it is understood as the rejection of self-identification by any group, including a national group, in exchange for “global” self-identification in the spirit of Jacques Attali or George Soros (but not Woodrow Wilson).

Such universalism, if it can be fully realized, would lead to a sharp decrease in the complexity of global society as a whole, and the international system in particular. Reducing complexity would, in turn, dramatically increase systemic risks and challenges. A field cultivated by humans is a far less stable and sustainable system than a natural forest.

The explosion of ethno-cultural, regional, national, religious and other forms of group identities that is unfolding before our very eyes is in fact nothing more than a natural re-

action of the system to threats associated with the tendency to reduce the complexity and diversity of its elements. A living cell does not want to turn into a dead crystal, not even a crystal with perfect edges.

As for the economy, the experience of recent decades demonstrated that

it is precisely the openness of the liberal world order that creates global social mobility that gives hundreds of millions of people in Asia, Latin America and Africa the opportunity to become part of the middle class.

It is the liberal world order that has allowed dozens of countries to dramatically increase their status in the global system. The rejection of the established mechanisms of the international circulation of goods, capital, technologies and social practices will not bridge the gap between the golden billion and the remaining six. On the contrary, the existing disparities will only grow.

Paradoxically, it is within the ranks of the notorious golden billion that active resistance to globalization and universalism is starting to grow. Rich aging Western societies are trying to protect themselves from the advance of the non-Western world — from growing migration flows, cheap goods and services, the import of terrorism and instability. The walls between developed and developing countries have been built by the former. The main threat to Wilsonianism today does not stem from the continued expansion of the West, but more likely from the fact that Western countries are closing in on themselves, and from the transition to a model of Western self-sufficiency at the expense of further global integration.

It is clear that regionalism as such does not necessarily supplant or run counter to globalization. It can be a form of globalization, since not all decisions need to be made at the global level.

There is no reason to believe that structures such as the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should dissolve into broader regional regimes sooner or later. On the contrary, regional integration associations are capable of performing the functions of laboratories where mechanisms and rules will be developed and tested for subsequent application on a global scale.

However, closing the participants of regional associations off in the shell that is their structures and institutions and creating exclusive regional orders will no doubt be one of the main challenges for the liberal international system. In this sense, the outright refusal of the Donald Trump administration to take part in Trans-Pacific and Transatlantic integration projects could, paradoxically, prove to speed up rather than slow down economic globalization.

WILSONIANISM: A STEP BACKWARD COMPARED TO THE CONCERT OF EUROPE?

The period of European and world history between the First and Second World Wars (1918–1939) is often compared with the period of the Concert of Europe that preceded it (1815–1913). A common opinion is that the Congress of Vienna that took place in the early 20th century created a more reliable, stable and secure international system than the Paris Peace Conference a century later. The argument is that artificial Wilsonian construct did not give the world long-term stability and prosperity and turned out to be a clear regression compared to the conservative but practical and reliable concept of European multipolarity.

It is hardly correct to place the blame on Wilson for the many imperfections of the Versailles system which preordained its catastrophic end just two decades later. The U.S. political elite did not support the president's plans — and not because Americans had some genetic predisposition to isolationism but due to tactical mistakes by Woodrow Wilson and his closest advisor colonel Edward M. House (they simply forgot to invite key Republican senators to Paris to secure the backing of Congress leaders). President Wilson merely turned out to be unskillful at domestic politics. His speeches in small provincial towns and at way-stations across the United States in the aftermath of the Paris Conference only proved that he lacked appeal to ordinary Americans. European allies, Britain and France, were not ready to accept Wilsonianism, even in an abridged form, seeing it as idle talk and the height of American naïveté. And Russia and Germany were not active participants of the Versailles process at all. However, there is a place for a comparison of the two paradigms of the world order, even if they are separated by more than a century.

What is the main difference between the views of Foreign Minister of the Austrian Empire Klemens von Metternich and President of the United States Woodrow Wilson? Von Metternich believed that the foundation of European and world peace was the balance of power, maintaining a stable equilibrium of rival powers of similar strength and influence. This is why he consistently opposed any plans to unify Germany, as well as those to unify France and Belgium. For him, cooperation was, on the whole, subordinated to rivalry.

Woodrow Wilson did not see the world as a static multipolar balance of power, but rather as a dynamic integrative model in which the United States was the lowest common denominator. He really expected that Washington could control London and Paris through their debts to the United States. A quarter of a century later, Wilson's successor, 32nd U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, cognizant of the geopolitical vulnerability of traditional Wilsonianism sought to revise and broaden it (the Four Global Policemen plan of 1941 reinvented as the plan to establish the United Nations and the Bretton Woods system in 1944–45 involving the Soviet Union and China as key participants of both structures). The goal of both Wilson and Roosevelt was to consolidate the global core and stabilize the periphery.

Cooperation was therefore more important than rivalry, which in balance was sacrificed to the process of progressive rapprochement of the elements that make up the "core."

This, of course, does not mean that Wilson was an idealist or a cosmopolitan — there is no reason to doubt his nationalism. Wilson's ideal was a model that is very much like the construct of the unipolar world led by the United States at the turn of the 21st century. But it would be wrong to liken the 28th President of the United States to the 43rd President of the United States (George W. Bush). Woodrow Wilson believed in the value of multipolar diplomacy and the importance of achieving compromise and, unlike George W. Bush, he was prepared in principle to delegate a part of U.S. sovereignty to a universal international organization. In other words, Wilson's unipolarity included compromises, concessions and compensations to other participants in the international system, something that was entirely absent from U.S. policy at the beginning of the 21st century.

If we were to point to a country today whose positions correspond closely with the initial tenets of Wilsonianism, then it is not the United States, but China. When, in early 2017, President of the People's Republic of China Xi Jinping delivered his keynote address in Davos, Switzerland, in defense of free trade and against a new wave of protectionism, he was talking specifically about preserving and strengthening the core of the global financial and economic system. It is telling that he did not talk about a multipolar world in the classic sense of the word, or about the balance of power in the world.

With all the obvious shortcomings and imperfections of Wilsoniansim, it still looks more relevant than the Concert of Europe of the 19th century.

We have been talking of multipolarity for two decades, but it has yet to materialize. There is too much of an imbalance among the potential participants in the global concert of the 21st century. They are too asymmetrical in their relations with each other. The foundations of the traditional hierarchy in world politics have been undermined too much. And non-state actors have acquired too large a role in world affairs.

Wilson's international model compares to the model of the Concert of Europe just in the same way that a cumbersome, spluttering and clunky car of the early 20th century compared to an elegant, reliable and familiar horse-drawn carriage. The horse-drawn carriage was better than the clumsy car in all respects, with the sole exception that it had exhausted all possibilities for its future development by the beginning of the 20th century.

WILSONIANSIM: A RELIC OF A BYGONE ERA?

This brief overview of the debate about the fate of the liberal world order leads us to the conclusion that it is still too early to confine the ideas of the 28th President of the United

States to the museum of delusional human thought. But it would be equally erroneous to write off Wilsonianism as a kind of dogma. It would seem that the world order of the 21st century will have little in common with the liberal theories of the previous century or its foreign policy practices. Let us try to determine the most likely rules of this new game, even in the most general sense, starting from the principles of Wilsonianism.

WILL THE EMERGING SYSTEM BE RATIONAL?

In the liberal paradigm, rationality is not a sophisticated multi-stage combination played by sovereign rulers. Rather, it is a balanced representation of different and often divergent group interests in the international arena. Based on this understanding of rationality, we can assume that the new system will be more rational than the current one. Not because future leaders will be wiser, more democratic or perspicacious than today's leaders, but because the

multifaceted group interests will find greater opportunities to be realized in international life directly, bypassing the bottleneck of the foreign policy apparatus.

What is more, states will be increasingly forced to join coalitions with these non-state actors, since foreign policy will rapidly lose its effectiveness if these partners are not involved.

Of course, states will not cede their role as the main players in global politics in the foreseeable future. The gap between long-term development interests of the global population and the tactical interests of the national elites and societies will persist, thus legitimizing the role of states as intermediaries in the communication between the national and global levels.

But the monopoly of this intermediation will become a thing of the past. In the context of growing interdependence, the information and communication revolution, unprecedented social stratification and the diversity of identities, the interaction between the different layers of society (individual, local, regional, national and global) will be carried out in a variety of forms, many of which the state is not even able to grasp, much less control. So the state will continue to desperately defend its old forts and ravelins, while society continues to stubbornly master new continents and oceans.

WILL THE SYSTEM BE NORMATIVE?

The experience of recent years shows that it is becoming increasingly difficult for state leaders to seek negotiations and legally binding agreements. Legislative bodies are reluctant to take on new obligations and drag their heels when it comes to ratifying agreements.

Populists everywhere are strengthening their positions. And direct appeals to voters through referendums often bring about unexpected and unwanted results.

It would seem that the regulatory and legal framework of global politics will develop along the lines of increasing the number of non-legally binding commitments that states (and non-state actors) take upon themselves voluntarily. For example, on the whole, the United States complies with the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Decisions made by the G20 do not impose any legal obligations on the member countries. Their implementation is monitored by the so-called peer review process, which is purely consultative in nature. The United States pulling out of the Paris Agreement has not stopped individual U.S. cities from voluntarily taking on the commitments to reduce emissions, trying in their own way to keep the spirit of the agreement alive.

Looking to the future, we can assume that the system of rigid international organizations, with its clearly fixed set of rights and obligations with regard to its members, will gradually be supplemented with — and eventually replaced by — a system of more flexible international regimes that regulate certain aspects of international life. Participants in global politics and the global economy will be able to select a set of regimes that suits them best, a set that corresponds to their own specific features, interests and opportunities. This is more or less how things work in the modern economy, where workers can often choose their own schedule, workload and workplace.

Obviously, we should look for a new balance between particularism and universalism here too. The question of the future of the liberal world order is ultimately a question of selecting the unchallenged and unalienable obligations of the participants in global politics. It is a complicated but solvable issue.

In any case, this kind of evolution does not necessarily mean diluting the legal foundations of the international system. In the emerging world order, the significance of political reputation and the responsibility of states will increase, and any violation of obligations undertaken (even voluntarily) will inevitably bring about negative consequences for the guilty parties. The cost of having a bad record will grow. This is due, in particular, to the new and never-before-seen level of transparency of global politics, in which foreign policy decisions or even announced intentions quickly become public knowledge. It is also due to the erosion of international hierarchies, which in the past required unconditional solidarity with the in-group and did not leave much room for moral and ethical choice.

It is not difficult to predict that we will see more and more examples of conscious and targeted smear campaigns in the future, much like the games being played right now against national currencies on financial markets.

WILL THE WORLD SYSTEM BE MORE OPEN FOR NEW PLAYERS AS WELL AS MORE TRANSPARENT?

Yes, in the sense that it will not rely on the hegemony of a single power, whether it be the United States or China. This does not mean that the new world order will not have its own hierarchies. They will be unavoidable, but those will be different hierarchies, built around specific international issues or areas of cooperation. For example, while the United States is much stronger and more influential than Canada in almost every respect, it is Canada (alongside Russia) and not the United States that acts as the superpower in the Arctic Council. On the other hand, despite the incompatibility of Russia and South Korea in terms of size and potential, Seoul occupies a higher position in the global trade hierarchy than Moscow, with a foreign trade turnover currently double that of Russia's. The presence of multiple parallel hierarchies increases the number of points of entry into the system and boosts its status within the system itself, making it more pluralistic, stable and universal.

None of this means that global politics will inevitably develop along Wilsonian lines in the 21st century. Just like after the First World War, humankind now has the opportunity to choose a specific balance between universalism and particularism, between hard and soft power, between globalization and regionalization, between free trade and protectionism, between law and morality, and between interdependence and sovereignty.

There is no need to make a single life-changing choice here. There will be countless different situational and often inconsistent decisions that will be taken on a daily and even hourly basis by a great number of participants in global politics. The totality of these decisions will lead the world either to greater unity, or to deeper separation. The very strength of the global system will be determined by the flexibility of its norms and mechanisms, which are the essence of an open world order.



OLGA TROITSKAYA

**THE RIGHT
OF NATIONS**
TO SELF-DETERMINATION

The right of nations to self-determination was introduced into international politics one hundred years ago. However, there is still no established definition in international law of what exactly constitutes a nation (the criteria and borders that are used), what is meant by self-determination (autonomy or independence), and how this right relates to the concept of territorial integrity. This uncertainty has led to the principle of self-determination, conceived as a means of eliminating wars between states, itself becoming a source of domestic and international conflicts around the world. The centenary of Woodrow Wilson's speech is a good opportunity to analyze what has happened to the former President's ideas in practice — the degree to which they have panned out and what lies ahead for them.

1. The liberal concept outlined by Wilson has consolidated its positions in international politics due to the increase of the number of countries that now share Wilsonian beliefs

In 1918, Wilson was the only leader among the major powers who supported the universal right of all nations — regardless of their size, strength or level of development — to self-determination. For Wilson, the realization of this right was the ultimate goal and meaning of political reorganization. Lenin, who had proposed the same concept slightly earlier, saw self-determination as a tactical instrument for bringing down empires, thus giving the nation states the opportunity to unite on a different, class basis. On the other hand, as far as the victors of the First World War were concerned, only the most developed nations should have the right to self-determination. In other words, it was a right exclusively reserved for themselves, as they believed that the peoples of the empires were not civilized enough for political self-government. This hierarchical view was enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations in the form of a system of mandates that remained unshakeable until the mass decolonization of the 1960s.

As we enter 2018, Wilson's liberal concept has been adopted by several dozen of the most developed countries in the world, from North America to Europe and

Oceania. The processes of European integration and the transatlantic alliance with the United States that began in the second half of the 20th century, helped in part by the spread of liberal democratic regimes across Europe, including because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, led European countries to draw closer to the positions of their American counterparts on the issue of self-determination. Their relatively stable and consistent approach to resolving the problem of separatism in the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo, as well as in the former Soviet states, is proof of this.

2. The criteria for adjudicating the legitimacy of self-determination have changed: the aspect connected with the violation of human rights has been strengthened, and the relevant norms have been added to international law

In 1918, arguments about the right of nations to self-determination were closely tied to the historical context marked by civil wars for independence and conflicts between major powers for colonies and domination in Europe. From Wilson's perspective, nobody had a more legitimate claim for self-determination than those nations that had once been independent but had seen their independence destroyed by expansionist policies of other states.

In 2018, the legitimacy of claims for self-determination is more closely tied to the human rights discourse than to the liberation discourse. Thanks to the UN Charter and other important documents adopted after the Second World War, the right to political self-determination and the freedom from aggression are now accepted as axiomatic. The focus of legitimization has shifted to the characteristics of the political regime, namely: the extent to which the regime respects the basic human rights as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 and other international legal documents.

3. The liberal interpretation only recognizes the legitimacy of self-determination if the nation in question opts for a liberal democratic regime

In a sense, the contemporary take on the principle of self-determination moved toward the provisions of classical liberal theory, namely John Locke's social contract theory, which states that people have the right to revolt against power if that power violates the human being's natural rights to life, liberty and property on a large scale. Applied to contemporary realities, this means that the demand for self-determination can be considered legitimate in three cases:

- 1) if a government pursues a policy of genocide, ethnic cleansing or mass terror against its citizens;
- 2) if a government restricts the freedoms of its citizens on a massive scale;

3) if a government pursues a discriminatory policy that significantly restricts the economic development and the growth of prosperity of its citizens.

In this sense, supporters of the liberal concept regard revolutions and separatism as essentially the same, as both are brought about by the regime's encroachment on the rights of its citizens — only in the first case it concerns the rights of the entire population, while in the second it concerns the rights of a minority. In both cases, mass violations justify the radical breakdown of the political order, since human rights are more important than the principles of territorial integrity and the state's right to violence. At the same time, only the self-determination that leads to the establishment of a liberal democratic regime is considered genuine because only a liberal democratic regime can guarantee that the people's rights and freedoms will not be violated in the future.

4. Today, the spread of the liberal concept is limited by alternative interpretations, which understand self-determination as the democratic choice of any, even non-liberal, regime

If imperialism and communism were the 20th century alternatives to the Wilsonian concept, then in the 21st century it is confronted by ethnocultural and statist concepts, represented by Russia and China, respectively.

Unlike the liberal concept, which understands nation as a political community of citizens endowed with equal rights, the *ethnocultural concept* sees it primarily as a cultural community with specific ethnic, religious and linguistic characteristics and which is not tied to political rights or jurisdiction. Accordingly, self-determination is seen as the democratic choice of any regime, even a non-liberal one (communist, Islamic, etc.), that guarantees preservation of nation's ethnocultural or civilizational features. This approach sees separatist movements and revolutions toward liberal democracy as an attempt to break the legitimate political order against the will of the majority of the nation's population (that is, against their true self-determination). This is the logic that explains Russia's vehement opposition to color revolutions and the coup in Ukraine while at the same time supporting Crimea's right to self-determination, which held a referendum to become part of Russia, rather than of the new liberal democratic regime in Ukraine.

The *statist concept* does not allow for the possibility of the interests of the state and the nation being opposed to one another, as they are regarded as a single whole. This concept is now being advocated by China, not least due to the country's relative monoethnicity (Han Chinese make up more than 90% of the population). By definition, any force that challenges the legitimacy of the political order is an enemy of not only the regime but the entire nation and is thus subject to correction or elimination. As for internal disputes, these are resolved through the policy of cultural assimilation and intermingling with the ethnic majority aimed at melting all minorities into a single nation (the policy toward Tibet and Xinjiang). In international disputes, such an approach is characterized by the clear support for the principle of

territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, bordering on complete indifference to the humanitarian aspects and the respect for human rights.

5. All concepts have the potential for conflict that varies in terms of range, mechanisms and scale

The *statist concept* of self-determination stands out as the most conflict-free paradigm in international politics as it consistently upholds the priority of territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. At the same time, it is fraught with the risk of local conflicts erupting within the country, since it does not contain any political mechanisms for resolving disagreements with minority groups that call for their collective rights to be recognized.

The *ethnocultural concept* carries huge conflict potential within the zone conditionally marked out as nation's borders, although the borders themselves are changeable (how would one define the borders of the Russian world?). The lack of a clear definition of the nation paves the way for multiple and extremely diverse interpretations of what constitutes national interests — from supporting the right to use the Russian language as one's native tongue to forcibly protecting the rights of the Russian-speaking population in neighboring countries. Conflicts in this case are seen exclusively as forced defensive measures in support of the self-determination of peoples or Russian-speaking minorities who have made the democratic choice in favor of Russia and not the West — against the attempts of liberal forces to impose their values and their model of the political order onto them.

The *liberal democratic* concept has a conflict potential that is more global in scale, as it was originally based on universalist principles that are applicable to any point on the planet. Guided by these principles, Western countries consider it necessary to interfere in every major violent conflict in order to prevent mass violations of the law and help form a just political system — a liberal democracy. The lowering of the threshold for intervention and the unequivocal support for pro-liberal anti-government forces have become an important factor in the unleashing of domestic political conflicts, as well as conflicts with countries that do not support the liberal interpretation of self-determination.

6. Self-determination conflicts persist to this day around the world, regardless of the level of development and political regime of the country.

Finally, against the backdrop of the referendums on independence in Scotland and Catalonia, in 2018 we cannot ignore the very real problem of separatism in developed countries. Unlike in developing countries, where the main reasons for self-determination are the repressive policies of the regime (the government violating the rights of its citizens to life and liberty), developed countries see the violation of the peoples' right to sustainable economic development as an increasingly prominent factor.

Scotland and Catalonia are examples of regional separatism that challenge the legitimacy of the political system on the grounds that it prevents the realization of a more effective socioeconomic model and thereby causes long-term tangible damage to the wellbeing of the region's citizens. Nationalist rhetoric, with its spiritual, cultural and historical symbols, in this case serves as nothing more than a mobilizing ideology for rallying mass support.

This is not a new phenomenon in the history of self-determination. The separation of the United States from Great Britain also started as an economic conflict over the principles of taxation. The calls for independence from the colonial administrations were based on the underlying economic protest against the policy of uneven development favoring the parent state. In this sense, the power of economic factors should not be underestimated. We should remember, however, that economic benefits are rarely significant enough for secession, since they are balanced by the extremely high costs of breaking ties — and in all cases the use of violence against those protesting became the deciding factor in favor of breaking away.

The best response to the challenge of economic separatism is the rational discussion of the existing balance of costs and benefits and a reassessment of any structural imbalances, if indeed they exist. For all the risk and uncertainty of the outcome, this can significantly weaken the arguments of the separatists in the long term (as in the case of the United Kingdom). A repressive response from the center only adds fuel to the fire, adding up claims of infringement of the rights and freedoms of citizens to grievances about economic distribution, which only strengthens the positions of the separatists (as in the case of Spain).

Thus, Wilson's idea that the right of nations to self-determination serves to eliminate conflicts only pans out when we are talking about relations between liberal democratic states, in full accordance with the democratic peace theory — and even then with the proviso that respect for this right only eliminates violent conflicts. Separatist movements take on a peaceful form, but the very problem of separatism and political conflicts surrounding them never disappear.

Beyond the liberal democratic states, the Wilsonian concept of self-determination comes up against growing resistance. Unlike the post-war periods of the 20th century, when the great powers could agree among themselves about the basic interpretations of the concepts of nation and self-determination and redraw the political map accordingly, the current context is characterized by an increasing polarization and irreconcilability of the positions of Russia and the West in their interpretations of each case of self-determination, which leads to an increased propensity toward conflict on a global scale and the renders the problem of the status of self-determined nations insolvable.



OLEG **SHAKIROV**

OPEN
DIPLOMACY

Before laying out the Fourteen Points in his speech at the joint session of the U.S. Congress on January 8, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson drew a distinction between the diplomatic styles of the Central Powers and the Allied Powers, with the former being secretive, ambiguous in their statements and dishonest and the latter demonstrating none of these characteristics. For reasons of solidarity Wilson turned a blind eye to the secret treaties of the Entente powers (disclosed in late 1917 by another advocate of open diplomacy — the Soviet Government) and nonetheless proclaimed that the era of secret diplomacy had come to an end. Secret agreements had become a prologue to war, and negotiating behind closed doors raised questions as to who a country's representatives were speaking on behalf of — the majority of the population or a narrow group of individuals. Wilson thus put forward two related arguments in favor of open diplomacy: 1) it will help maintain peace; and 2) such an approach meets the needs of democratic governance. The discussion about this continues to this very day.

HOLDING NEGOTIATIONS

The formulation of the principle itself in the first of the Fourteen Points was more questionable. Calling for “open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind” and for diplomacy that “shall proceed always frankly and in the public view”, Wilson imagined that both the various agreements between states and negotiations per se could be open. Through his own experience, he would soon become convinced of the complexity of such an approach. Attempts to “openly arrive at” agreements at the Paris Peace Conference following the end of the First World War failed, with the peace accords ultimately being negotiated behind the scenes and promulgated afterward. In practice, the principle put forward by Wilson had immediately morphed into “open covenants, confidentially arrived at.”

It would be an exaggeration to say that there is no room in modern diplomacy for talks to take place out of the public eye. Maintaining the secrecy of the

negotiating process makes it possible to handle specific diplomatic tasks: build trusting relations; discuss sensitive issues; examine and test solutions that are outside the mainstream; consult with people whom the public does not consider to be a trustworthy partner; decide upon a mutually acceptable pace of joint work, etc. The value of the traditional approach was convincingly confirmed by the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States — the announcement was made after 18 months of secret negotiations.

However, total secrecy seems to be the exception today. The international information environment has changed dramatically over the past hundred years. Diplomacy has tried to keep pace with the development of information and communications technology (ICT): from the emergence and then widespread use of radio and television broadcasts, live broadcasts and mobile communications to the internet and social networks. The speed of communication in the internet age has become virtually instantaneous, and the spread of the web nears becoming universal. The information revolution has made it radically easier and cheaper to exchange ideas, and has contributed to the emergence of new forms of communication and cooperation between individuals. This open environment presents both an opportunity and a challenge for traditional diplomacy, which functions as the main mediator in inter-state relations.

Thanks to the internet, diplomats have new means of communication, from email to instant messaging, which in theory allow them to organize meetings at any time and with any combination of participants, without attracting unwanted attention. The reverse side of this is the vulnerability of information, which was clearly demonstrated in 2010–2011, when WikiLeaks, with the support of the world media, published an archive of U.S. diplomatic cables. Those who supported the leak claimed that the information disclosed was of public value, while diplomats around the world were more concerned with just how protected electronic channels of communication actually are.

Diplomacy has long been a noticeable part of the 24-hour news cycle. The close attention the media pays to every step taken by high-ranking diplomats and national leaders, the tallying up of their tactical wins and losses and the publication of information leaks may provide an insight into how foreign policy is conducted, but do not always benefit diplomatic efforts. Premature public disclosure can disrupt discussions on a delicate issue. Public opinion may demand from diplomats simple solutions to international problems that are beyond their control. As a result, the line between domestic and foreign policy is becoming increasingly blurred, and foreign policy itself is at risk of being turned into foreign politics.

THE RESULTS OF NEGOTIATIONS: TREATIES AND COMPLIANCE WITH THEM

Wilson's direct achievement and a truly innovative move was the mandatory registration and publication of treaties. The corresponding requirement for all international treaties and engagements was written into Article 18 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, with the additional caveat that "no such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered." A similar provision on the registration of treaties and agreements was included in the UN Charter (Article 102). However, under this document, as well as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, registration is no longer a condition for a treaty or agreement to enter into force. To date, the UN Secretariat has registered and published over 250,000 treaties or treaty actions.

Of course, the formal procedure for registering and publishing treaties did not prevent countries from signing secret agreements in the period running up to the Second World War. The development of international law based on the UN Charter, decolonization, the stabilizing role of the bipolar world order and the democratization of states — all this made a huge contribution to suppressing secret plans to redraw the world order. Of course, there are still treaties and agreements that have not been published and registered by the UN Secretariat, and they exist at the level of cooperation between militaries, intelligence agencies and other sensitive spheres. But they are limited in scale, and they are not comparable in nature to the kind of agreements that the 28th U.S. President opposed.

Finally, one hundred years after Wilson's speech, it is not just secret agreements that are losing their significance, as traditional, legally binding agreements are in principle going out of fashion. The first decade of the 21st century was marked by a decline in the number of formal bilateral and multilateral agreements signed compared with previous periods⁴. The tendency toward the development of the concept of soft law is becoming increasingly noticeable in international law-making, whereby groups of states voluntarily undertake various kinds of political commitments (from established sets of obligations such as the resolutions of the UN General Assembly to the various codes, guidelines and regulations of intergovernmental organizations and the decisions of the G20). The very fact that commitments are public serves as the mechanism of openness. States consider it beneficial to comply with such commitments for a number of reasons including reputational ones despite the fact that the norms of soft power do not inherently have any legal force.

In his formulation of the principle of open diplomacy, Woodrow Wilson stops at treaties and does not take the next step, which is to examine the problem of verifying compliance

⁴ Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel, Jan Wouters, "When Structures Become Shackles: Stagnation and Dynamics in International Lawmaking," *European Journal of International Law* Vol. 25 no. 3, 2014, <http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/25/3/2520.pdf>

with treaties within the context of openness. These days, however, more or less transparent verification of the implementation of agreements is carried out in various spheres, including international trade (dispute resolution within the framework of the WTO) and agreements of environmental protection. Monitoring and compliance verification have become closely associated with agreements concerning the issues of the maintenance of peace, particularly in the arms control field.

Certain measures to verify compliance with international treaties and agreements can be carried out without the cooperation of the party under inspection with the help of national technical means of verification. Others require the consent and cooperation of the party under inspection: for example, onsite inspections and the installation of special equipment (IAEA's use of systems for real-time monitoring of uranium enrichment to verify compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear program). Some confidence- and security-building measures require similar cooperation. Most of these agreements involve the exchange of information exclusively among the participants, but there may be a large number of participants, which would make the agreements increasingly universal. The participants could see such measures as examples of open diplomacy: openness is used to reduce uncertainty and overcome security dilemmas.

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

At the same time, openness today is an indicator of the quality of governance. How does diplomacy respond to demands for accountability and increased transparency at various levels? At the national level, foreign policy activity can be carried out under the supervision of the general public and legislators (through open and closed hearings) and may be criticized by the political opposition. Openness is buttressed by the provision of open data, audits followed by publicly available reports and measures like the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in the United States, etc. In the long term, these processes may lead to a convergence of ministries of foreign affairs, which traditionally have been enjoying a privileged and distinct position in most of Western countries, with "ordinary" ministries in terms of such practical issues as hiring and rotating personnel, financial reporting and the provision of public services.

Similarly, transparency is also in demand within inter-state organizations, primarily the United Nations. The election of the UN Secretary General in 2016 took place in accordance with the established procedure, that is, by secret informal straw polls in the UN Security Council. However, for the first time in the organization's history, an election campaign of sorts initiated by the representatives of several member states and NGOs was held for the candidates in the form of open hearings and televised debates at the General Assembly. The top pick of the open discussions, António Guterres, ended up

gaining the necessary support from the Security Council. Frictions between the two approaches were thus avoided, although they very well may emerge in the future.

CONCLUSION

Implementing the principle of openness with regard to international agreements and negotiations has had different consequences for world politics. The provision regarding the mandatory registration and publication of international agreements, along with other circumstances, gradually narrowed the space for the use of secret agreements. The principle of openness has become the foundation of soft law and has also been implemented in the of treaty compliance verification regimes, including in the arms control field, which has strengthened international security. As for negotiations and diplomacy in the broader sense, the principle of openness is still ambiguous. The information revolution has helped to lift the veil from the foreign political process. But it has also had a disruptive effect. Secret negotiations remain an integral part of the diplomatic toolkit, although states will have to exert increasingly greater efforts to maintain confidentiality. Steps toward increasing the transparency of the work carried out by diplomats can improve the work of bureaucracies at various levels, although they may be seen as an attempt against the established hierarchies and thus encounter resistance. At the same time, it is unrealistic to expect a return to the traditional approach. On the contrary, the winners will be those who learn how to effectively use the resources of the era of openness in diplomacy.



ALEXEY **PORTANSKIY**

FREE TRADE:
THE GOAL FOR
ALL TIMES

Among the issues that provoke disputes and disagreements that persist for decades and even centuries, free trade occupies a fairly high position. Free trade advocates will point to a number of advantages that can be obtained through the unimpeded exchange of goods and services: cheaper imports; healthier competitive environment; new opportunities through market expansion; technological progress, etc. Its opponents will reel off an equally impressive list: the unfair distribution of benefits among rich and poor countries; the imperfection of the competitive environment and the infringement on the interests of less developed countries; the risks for emerging industries; the complications for the balance of payments in a number of countries; excessively high interdependence at the expense of economic independence and, consequently, the undermining of state security.

Detailed research articles or even doctoral theses can be written on each of the advantages and disadvantages of free trade mentioned in the previous paragraph. But this is unlikely to help resolve the issue. What can be done in such a situation? Let us take a look at history and compare it with what is happening today.

The concept of free trade had various meanings at different stages in the development of civilization. It can be assumed that, until the late Middle Ages, free trade was largely determined by the existence of safe conditions for trade — that is, the absence of threats of violence against trade caravans, sea and river transportation and merchants themselves. With the development of international relations and the growing influence of the state on foreign economic ties, the concept of free trade turned into a measure of the state's impact on the foreign economic sphere and came to be seen as an alternative to the policy of state protectionism. Since that time, discussions have raged about what exactly should determine a state's trade policy — freedom or protectionism? Openness or “fairness”? Most of the developed states of today have been through different trade policy periods. The history of the United States provides an instructive example of how state attitude toward free trade has evolved.

The American Revolution was, among other things, caused by British mercantilist policy that included a whole set of trade restrictions imposed by London on its colonies. However, after gaining independence, Americans, surprisingly enough, fell for trade protectionism that they had until recently vehemently condemned. The rationale was that the fledgling industries needed protection. And throughout the whole 19th century, except for short periods during its middle, until the early 20th century tariffs in the United States were mostly increasing. Yet according to renowned American economist Frank William Taussig, the high tariffs of that period did not in fact contribute to industrial development. In short, during the first stage of the development of United States' economy protectionism did not help the rise of its industries.

Some liberalization of trade came only in 1913 after the White House was taken by Democrat Woodrow Wilson. However, that liberalization was short-lived — Republicans returned to power after the First World War and raised tariffs once again. The pre-war Republican period was marked by the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act passed in 1930 during the Great Depression. The act raised tariffs on dutiable imports to the highest level in more than 100 years. For most items rates have increased by 50% and for some even by 100%. It did not take long for external partners to respond — Europe imposed reciprocal protectionist measures, which further aggravated the global crisis.

In the Anglo-Saxon world, the lessons learned from the Great Depression led to the establishment of fundamentally new approaches to trade and economic relations — free trade based on non-discrimination and market predictability. New principles replaced the beggar-thy-neighbor policy that dominated trade relations for centuries.

For the United States the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act experience became an antidote to protectionism — until the end of the 20th century the United States remained the primary champion of market liberalization. Still, while promoting free trade, the United States took care of its national interests, too. For instance, when providing lend-lease aid to countries fighting Nazi Germany the United States made that conditional on the elimination of trade barriers. Thus, Americans sought to get access to previously closed territories, in particular to the markets of countries ruled by the British Empire. When drafting together with Britain final decisions of the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference based on the new principles, the United States was simultaneously achieving the goal of establishing the U.S. dollar as the global currency.

As the greatest economic power on the planet after the Second World War the United States was naturally interested in ensuring unrestricted access to foreign markets for its companies. The most efficient way to do it was to create a multilateral institutional mechanism to regulate trade. That is why the United States played the key role in all rounds of trade negotiations in the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) signed in 1947 until the establishment of the WTO in April 1994. The negotiations under the aegis

of the GATT resulted in a tenfold decrease of the average rate of import duties, which correspondingly led to substantial liberalization of international trade in goods and fairly met interests of American businesses.

However, the outset of the 21st century witnessed considerable shifts in the global landscape — the emergence of new large actors in the world economy, most notably China and India whose concept of the global economic order was quite different from that of the United States and other developed countries. In that sense, the two camps were supposed to be reconciled in particular during the new round of trade negotiations — the Doha Round or the Development Round that started in the end of 2001. Yet, by 2011 the negotiations were deadlocked. Washington reacted by relinquishing its leadership in multilateral trade negotiations, a trend already apparent during the presidency of Barack Obama. United States' faith in the efficiency of further liberalization at the multilateral level, i.e. in the framework of the WTO, started to wane. That is because from the U.S. perspective, most member states including developing countries simply do not comply with the existing rules of the organization or enjoy unjustified privileges, which undercuts the efforts of developed countries in the multilateral trade system.

Winning the 2016 presidential elections, Donald Trump adopted a blatantly protectionist stance. He accused several countries, primarily China and Mexico, of unfair competition that, according to Trump, resulted in the substantial U.S. trade deficit and threatened them with multifold increase in import duties at the same time promising Americans to bring jobs and manufacturing back to the country. Moreover, Washington declared its readiness to contravene WTO rules should U.S. interests require that. However, such a scenario would cause chaos in international trade and would become a catastrophe for the current global economy defined by profound interdependence between national economies.

A year ago, Xi Jinping made headlines at the opening of the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos. In his speech, the President of the People's Republic of China advocated the renouncing of protectionist trade policies and warned that “no one will emerge as a winner in a trade war” — a remarkable statement from the leader of the country that less than 10 years ago, during the global economic crisis, came under heavy criticism for its extensive protectionist measures. That is why when Donald Trump launched his presidential campaign he only had to renew and ramp up accusations against China of unfair competition and protectionism with regard to the United States. In 2017 in Davos, however, against the backdrop of United States' apparent lurch toward protectionism and ensuing worldwide dissatisfaction with it, Beijing decided to turn the tables picking offense as the best defense. It was not surprising that the general reaction of World Economic Forum 2017 participants to Xi Jinping's speech was summed up in a catchphrase that “the world has turned upside down.”

We must admit that, in today's world, which is full of uncertainty and dwindling confidence in what tomorrow holds, the idea that trade destroys the job market (that the freer trade becomes, the greater damage it causes to the national labour market) is fairly widespread. But is that really the case?

Modern research unequivocally says that technology and innovation affect the labour market far greater than trade liberalization does. Thus, in developed countries, around 80% of job losses are caused by the introduction of new technologies, and almost 50% of jobs may disappear in the coming years. And these risks are even higher in many developing countries.

Yet calling for free trade is not easy either. This is because, as a rule, it takes time to reap the rewards of trade liberalization, while the consequences of removing trade barriers are usually felt immediately. If we apply Joseph Schumpeter's principle of creative destruction, we can say that the "destruction" caused by trade is "visible," while the benefits it "creates" remain "invisible."

One specific example that helps us understand the benefits that free trade brings to the modern globalized economy is that of the American corporation Apple. There is no doubt that using unskilled and relatively low-paid Chinese labour to manufacture components for their products deprives Americans of the opportunity to perform the same functions within the production chain. However, the result of this policy is that the company can sell its iPhones and iPads at prices that are affordable to the widest range of consumers. The opposite situation is easy to imagine: if all the components for Apple gadgets were produced in the United States (this is precisely what former President Barack Obama asked of Steve Jobs), it is unlikely that iPhones and iPads would be as ubiquitous as they are now — either that, or they would cost significantly more than they do now. New companies that the world cannot live without these days (for example, Uber and Airbnb) would never have appeared, not to mention all the apps and accessories that are made exclusively for Apple products.

As a matter of fact, this is an example of how free trade can make "invisible" benefits "visible." Without free trade, the production chains and global added value chains that extend to almost every country in the world and which already account for at least 60% of world trade would not be possible. This is the reality of the global world today, and even the president of the world's most developed economy is unlikely to change that. The trade protectionism preached by Trump for "making America great again" can only have a short-term positive effect, and even then only in areas where low-skilled labour is required. The example of Apple shows that hi-tech industries need free trade, as free trade provides smooth movement not only of goods and services, but also of know-how, technologies, high-skilled labour and entire production chains across borders.

At the turn of the 21st century, liberalization of the foreign economic sphere brought about impressive socioeconomic progress in developing countries in East Asia and other states around the world.

Finally, any conversation about free trade must necessarily include a discussion of the recent decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union. There is, of course, a paradox to this drama: a power that had for the course of the entire post-war period defended free trade more vehemently than any other country in Europe is now forced to expend enormous efforts to preserve free trade in its future relations with Europe. It turns out that free trade is really valuable, and this is felt especially acutely when it can be lost.

Only one conclusion can be drawn from what we have said here: if states want to continue along the path of economic progress, then free trade must be the key condition for that. Nevertheless, despite the obviousness of this conclusion, it probably will not put an end to the disputes between those who support free trade and those who oppose it.



PAVEL **GUDEV**

**FREEDOM
OF NAVIGATION:**
PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE
(1918–2018)

In years past, just like today, all coastal countries that have naval and merchant fleets are objectively interested in the freedom of navigation, as are landlocked countries that do not have direct access to the sea but that do have quite a number of vessels under their flags carrying out commercial transportation.

Shipping continues to be the cheapest mode of transport in the world today, which is why 70% of all global trade is carried out by sea. For all the participants — individual countries, companies that are focused on imports and exports and representatives of the shipping industry — protection of the principle of the freedom of navigation is economically determined, as it is the basis of their economic development and prosperity.

The second important determinant of this process is the political and ideological component. For most of Western countries, including the United States, the unhindered functioning of global trade serves as guarantee of the formation and further sustenance of the liberal world order they advocate. The free movement of freight by sea is not only the basis for their own economic well-being, it is also a key element of this world order. Protection of the freedom of navigation is a guarantee that the world economy will develop according to uniform universal rules, which the absolute majority of countries must abide by if they do not want to fall into the category of marginalized and rogue states.

The third determinant is of a strategic and military nature. Naval powers such as the United States and Russia are objectively interested in the unhindered deployment of their armed forces by sea to any point on earth, should the necessity arise. Freedom of navigation for warships is an opportunity to raise one's flag, prevent conflict, project strength and, finally, support allies. In this sense, freedom of navigation effectively serves as an element of national security strategy.

Within the framework of modern international maritime law, freedom of navigation is one of six freedoms of the high seas, along with freedom of overflight, freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under international law, freedom of fishing, and freedom of scientific research. At the same time, it is important to remember that, in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, freedom of navigation applies (for both naval and civil ships) not only to the high seas (i.e. the offshore area outside national jurisdictions), but also to the areas within the 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of coastal states.

At the same time, the very principle of protecting the freedom of navigation has a more extensive interpretation — not least because of the United States, which has been pursuing its own Freedom of Navigation (FON) policy since 1979. This interpretation involves counteracting any violations/restrictions of the convention's norms and provisions as they pertain to the passage of vessels and ships through maritime areas that fall under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of coastal states.

We are talking about countering violations of the right to innocent passage through the territorial waters of another state, the right of transit passage through international straits and the right of archipelagic passage through archipelagic waters. The principle of protecting the freedom of navigation is also aimed at fighting:

- illegally established (straight) baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured;
- incorrectly established external borders of the territorial sea;
- the expansion of the status of (internal) historical waters to a water area that had never previously been considered as such;
- the expansion of the jurisdiction of coastal states in the security area within the 24-mile contiguous zone;
- restrictions on carrying out marine scientific research within the EEZ;
- the prohibition of various types of naval activities within the EEZ.

In fact, protection of the freedom of navigation is increasingly being identified with the need to challenge the various legal claims of coastal states to limit the legitimate rights of third countries granted to them within the framework of international maritime law, primarily the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Today, the United States is the main advocate of protecting the freedom of navigation, which is unsurprising given the truly global nature of the country's political and economic as well as military and strategic interests.

On the other hand, the commitment of the United States to protecting the freedom of navigation is in sharp contrast with the fact that the country is not party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, having neither signed nor ratified the document. In this respect, the United States is in the same cohort with such countries as Syria, Libya, Iran, North Korea, Somalia and Venezuela, all of which it has at various times classified as rogue states, as well as several of the poorest African and Latin American states. The non-participation of the United States in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea essentially discredits an extremely important international regime.

What is more, the U.S. position that the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea codified within its framework the established norms of customary law, which thus make its provisions binding for all, including states that are not party to the Convention, is highly speculative. From the point of view of international legal doctrine, many of the provisions contained in the Convention, including those directly related to navigation (the right of transit passage, the right of archipelagic passage through archipelagic waters, the right to innocent passage for warships through the territorial waters of another state), can still not be considered norms of customary law as they are not implemented in practice universally.

Accordingly, the desire of the United States to see the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as a document that codifies the norms of customary law is nothing more than an attempt to harmonize the behavior of all states in the World Ocean while remaining outside the framework of the Convention itself and taking full advantage of the regime for its own national interests.

At present, the United States is actively carrying out its FON program in the following key regions:

- the Persian Gulf, in particular the Strait of Hormuz. Both Oman and Iran have access to that strait, through which passes around 90% of the oil produced by the Persian Gulf countries and 30% of all gas (more than 10% of the gas consumed by the United States) transported by sea;

- Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Peru, Ecuador);
- Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, the Philippines);
- South Asia (India, the Maldives, Pakistan, Sri Lanka);
- East Asia (China, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan);
- the Mediterranean (Albania, Italy, Malta, Croatia).

As we can see, the United States protects the freedom of navigation not only with regard to countries with which Washington has strained or overtly hostile relations, but also with regard to its key allies and partners, primarily Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. Despite the fact the violations of maritime law committed by the latter three countries are essentially insignificant and, as a rule, concern the incorrect drawing of baselines, it is nevertheless extremely important for the United States to state its position with respect to certain legal claims in order to prevent the emergence of a new legal norm.

The People's Republic of China is a special case inasmuch as it is a textbook example of a state that both widely interprets and directly violates the key norms and provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, primarily concerning the freedom of (military) navigation within EEZs and the right to innocent passage through territorial waters. These violations are directly caused by Beijing's desire to ensure a priority level of regional security in its coastal water areas in order to restrict the ability of the United States to conduct reconnaissance and other types of naval activities there.

Moreover, the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague on the South China Sea Arbitration case involving the Philippines and China bolstered the positions of the United States with regard to challenging the legal claims of China, which directly restricts passage to U.S. naval ships through maritime zones under China's sovereignty (territorial waters) or jurisdiction (EEZ). Specifically, the court ruled that all the island formations that make up the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea were either rocks capable of forming only a 12-mile territorial sea (rather than a 200-mile EEZ) or low-tide elevations that do not generate entitlement to maritime zones.

Accordingly, U.S. Navy ships were given the legitimate grounds to conduct any kind of naval activity in the vicinity of these island formations and disagree with the claims of China regarding the inadmissibility of carrying out naval maneuvers and exercises beyond the outer limits of the territorial sea surrounding the rocks. The only remaining stumbling

block is the Chinese authorization-based procedure for the passage of foreign warships through its territorial waters, which most definitely creates the threat of a localized military confrontation between the United States and China.

For Russia, the Arctic region has special economic, military and strategic significance. Russia's Arctic coastline is longer than that of any other state, meaning that the country has sovereignty and jurisdiction over a vast maritime area. The Northern Sea Route has been considered a national transport artery under the full control of Russia since Soviet times, and this is now fixed in Russian law. Russia has introduced an authorization-based procedure for foreign vessels and ships wishing to pass through the route and a requirement that ships must be piloted and have icebreaker assistance.

The United States fundamentally disagrees with this position. As far as it is concerned, the right of innocent passage applies to Russian territorial waters of the North Sea Route; the freedom of navigation (including military navigation) applies to Russia's EEZ; and the right of transit passage, which should not be suspended, applies to Russia's straits. The United States sees any kind of restriction on civil, and above all military navigation through these waters to be unfounded, insisting that icebreakers belonging to other countries be allowed passage, and that the measures introduced by Russia to protect the marine environment are not applicable to naval ships and vessels engaged in non-commercial government activities.

Despite the fact that practical steps to challenge the USSR's position on the Northern Sea Route were taken in the middle of the 1960s, and that diplomatic protests took place in the early 1980s, we can assume that the sharp deterioration in U.S.–Russia relations today could lead to a new standoff between the two countries on the issue of the freedom of navigation along the route. The worst possible scenario in this respect would be for the United States to decide to expand its FON program to include Russian Arctic waters, which without a doubt could bring the two countries to the brink of a direct military confrontation.

Thus, the freedom of navigation is one of the cornerstones of the use of the World Ocean. It forms the basis of the economic development and security of a significant number of states. The paradox of the situation is that the main proponent of the principle of the freedom of navigation is the United States, a country that is not party to the key international agreement in this area – the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. At the same time, the practical steps taken by the United States in this area are, as a rule, connected with the use of naval forces and assets, rather than with diplomatic means of resolving differences. As a result, protecting the freedom of navigation does little to de-

escalate international tensions, often increasing them instead. At the same time, the UN mechanisms, including the Security Council, are not involved in this process at all. The logical question thus arises: Can the liberal world order, in which the freedom of navigation plays a very important role, be based exclusively on the use of military force, threats and warnings?



ALEKSEY **ARBATOV**

**DISARMAMENT:
UTOPIAN CONCEPT
OR IMPERATIVE
OF THE POST-WILSON
ERA?**

Point Four of President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points speech proposing the principles of a new world order, which was delivered to Congress on January 8, 1918, reads as follows: "Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety."⁵ The idea was quite logical: the future war-free world would have no need for large armed forces, and the resources that would be saved could be used for peaceful purposes.

1. THE EMBRYONIC PERIOD

The first attempts at disarmament were made out of fear of a new war, and in the spirit of Wilson's fourth point. The memories of the horrific gas attacks that took place during the First World War resulted in the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Despite certain violations, the document was largely observed even during and after the Second World War. In the 1920s and 1930s, short-lived treaties on restricting the size of the leading maritime powers' navies were concluded in Washington and London. The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, which still regulates the passage of naval ships through the Black Sea straits, was signed in 1936.

But all this was just pale reflection of Wilson's global idea. The arms race gained momentum in the 1930s: Germany was seeking revenge for its defeat in Europe; Japan had embarked upon a military expansion in the Pacific; and the Soviet Union was building socialism in a hostile capitalist environment and preparing for a major war that was to be won "with only small losses, and on foreign soil."

Then the Second World War broke out, claiming 70 million lives in six years and turning Europe and the Far East into ruins in the process. The unprecedented

⁵ *Systemic History of International Relations in 14 Volumes, 1918–2003. Vol. 2. Documents of the 1910s through the 1940s. M. 2000, pp. 27–28.*

horrors of that war reignited the hopes for a lasting peace and disarmament that had first been voiced by Wilson. Unfortunately, those hopes proved futile: the international community split into two opposing camps, led by the USSR and the United States, respectively. And nuclear weapons, which remain the most destructive weapons in the history of humankind, were created and first used. The Cold War ensued, accompanied by an unprecedented nuclear and conventional arms race.

At the same time, however, the idea of disarmament captured the imagination of the humankind as a symbol and tangible guarantee of the rejection the idea of a third world war. It is true that, before the early 1960s, disarmament would only be addressed in the form of rhetorical battles within the framework of the United Nations and other forums, and that the USSR and the West both claimed primacy in promoting this good cause. In reality, the world would periodically find itself on the brink of a nuclear standoff; the fragility of this balance culminated in the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962.

In response to Khrushchev's major bluff about the Soviet Union's supposed missile superiority following the launch of the first artificial satellite in 1957, the United States stepped up its efforts to build up nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In 1967, the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) increased their missile arsenal by a factor of 40 (!)⁶. Realizing where these processes were leading, Khrushchev authorized the deployment of medium-range missiles in Cuba in an attempt to address the rapidly growing disparity with the United States. What happened next is well known.

This is how nuclear deterrence nearly resulted in nuclear war. The unlimited destructive power as well as the unprecedented complexity of new weapons and plans of their use created a fundamentally new situation in which warfare was no longer an instrument but rather a determinant of politics. For this reason, disarmament turned from the symbol and ultimate guarantee of peace, as Wilson had envisioned it, into one of the primary areas of maintaining and strengthening peace.

2. THE BIRTH OF THE SYSTEM

The 1963 signing of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water signified the beginning of a five-decade period during which an extensive nuclear arms limitation and non-proliferation system would be created. The last Cold War crisis took place in autumn 1983, and was similarly caused by the dynamics of nuclear deterrence: namely, by the failure of the nuclear arms talks, the deployment of new medium-range missiles by the USSR, and the reciprocal steps taken by the United States.

⁶ Desmond Ball, *The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration*, Ph.D. dissertation (Canberra: University of Australia, 1972), *apps.* 1–3.

The conclusion is obvious: against the background of an unrestrained nuclear arms race, international conflicts periodically bring the world to the brink of a nuclear Armageddon, whereas with arms control processes and regimes in place, this can be avoided.

In the years that followed, three fundamental treaties were signed: the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) in 1972 and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks treaties (SALT I and SALT II) in 1972 and 1979. A number of other agreements were also signed: the cornerstone 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC); the 1967 Outer Space Treaty; the 1971 Seabed Arms Control Treaty; and the 1976 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests.

The Cold War and the arms race both came to an end with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF), which resulted in the destruction of 860 U.S. and 1840 Soviet missiles (the Soviet Union had twice as many missiles in its arsenal). The 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) also had a major role to play. Under the treaty, the Warsaw Treaty Organization abandoned the idea of military superiority and agreed to parity by reducing its arsenals by 34,700 units, four times the number reduced by NATO (8,700 units)⁷. Under the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I Treaty), the USSR and the United States reduced their strategic nuclear arsenals, cutting around 25% of their delivery platforms and 50% of their warheads. Furthermore, political commitments by Moscow and Washington allowed for an approximately tenfold reduction of the two countries' arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons (with a range of up to 500 kilometres).

Disarmament became an integral part of the relations between the world's leading military powers and one of central pillars of international security. Eventually, disarmament measures and agreements on controversial aspects of international politics led to the end of the Cold War and the arms race by the early 1990s.

3. THE GOLDEN AGE

In two decades following the end of the Cold War, it seemed that Wilson's dream was finally coming true. In accordance with the four fundamental treaties on strategic arms as well as unilateral measures, global nuclear arsenals (including those covered by the START

⁷ See A. Antonov, R. Ayumov. *Control over Conventional Arms in Europe: The End of a Regime or a Story to be Continued?* PIR Center. Moscow. 1 (27) 2012, p. 12.

I and the tactical nuclear weapons initiatives) were reduced by 80% in terms of the overall warhead count (from around 50,000 to 10,000)⁸. The Chemical Weapons Convention was signed in 1993, followed by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. The NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995, and was signed by more than 40 countries, including two nuclear powers (France and China). Seven countries (Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Iran, Kazakhstan, South Africa and Ukraine) surrendered their nuclear arsenals or closed their military nuclear programs, either voluntarily or by coercion. The NPT turned into one of the most universal international documents, besides the UN Charter, and only three countries in the world (India, Israel and Pakistan) remained outside of it.

The 1992 Treaty on Open Skies and the 2011 Vienna Document (first version adopted in 1990) established regimes of unprecedented transparency with regard to the operation of the Russian and NATO armed forces. The list of nuclear-weapon-free zones was expanded: in addition to Antarctica (1959) and Latin America (1967), it now includes the South Pacific (1985), Southeast Asia (1995), Africa (1996) and Central Asia (2006). A number of agreements involved banning and eliminating stockpiles of conventional arms (anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions), the physical security of nuclear materials, cooperation on the safe elimination and disposal of nuclear and chemical weapons, and the peaceful use of materials extracted from nuclear weapons (the 1991 Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the 1993 Megatons to Megawatts Program)⁹.

4. A NEW CRISIS

However, Wilson's dreams were once again doomed to fail. The signing of the New START in Prague in 2010 was followed first by a certain degree of stagnation in the disarmament process, and then by the disintegration of the disarmament system. Now, for the first time in five decades of talks and agreements on nuclear weapons (since the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water), the world is facing the prospect of losing, in the near future, treaty-based and legal control over the most destructive category of weapons in the history of humankind.

The weakest link in the nuclear control system is the 1987 INF Treaty between the USSR and the United States. For several years now, the sides have been accusing each other of violating the treaty. With the current presidential administration in power in Washington, the INF Treaty may well be denounced in the foreseeable future. Another manifestation of the crisis in nuclear arms control is that it has been six years since Russia and the United States last held talks on the next START Treaty. This is the longest pause in the 47-year history of these

⁸ *The START II (1993), START III (1997), Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT, 2002) and the New START (signed in Prague in 2010 and known in Russia as START III).*

⁹ *The treaty concerned turning HEU (high enriched uranium) to LEU (low enriched uranium).*

negotiations. The current START expires in 2021, after which a vacuum will form in the field of strategic arms control. Time is running out for the signing of a new treaty, given the massive disagreements over the missile defense systems (after the United States pulled out from the ABM Treaty in 2002) and over long-range precision-guided conventional weapons. Meanwhile the new U.S. administration has not demonstrated any particular interest in either concluding a new START Treaty or in prolonging the existing one until 2026.

The United States and Russia are on the verge of a new large-scale arms race. Unlike during the Cold War period, however, this nuclear arms race will be complemented by a competition in building up non-nuclear offensive and defensive strategic weapons as well as further development of space-based weaponry and cyber warfare. In addition, the new arms race will become multilateral and involve (in addition to Russia and the United States) China, NATO member states, India and Pakistan, North Korea and South Korea, Japan and other nations. Russia's geopolitical position renders it particularly vulnerable in this situation.

All attempts to involve other nuclear weapon states in the nuclear limitation process have so far failed. India and Pakistan are engaged in a bilateral nuclear arms race of their own, while Israel is holding on to its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent against its Islamic neighbors. The United Kingdom, France and China argue that some 90% of the world's nuclear arsenals is still controlled by Russia and the United States, and demand more substantial arms reductions from the two countries as a prerequisite for their own efforts to embrace nuclear disarmament.

Due to the negative position adopted by the United States the CTBT has still not come into force two decades after it was signed. It was also Washington's fault that resulted in the recent suspension of the agreement with Russia on eliminating excessive amounts of plutonium. Talks on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and on non-deployment of arms in outer space have been stuck in a dead end for years at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Over the past three years, Russia has disengaged from cooperation with the United States on the safe disposal, physical security and protection of nuclear weapons, materials and facilities. In 2015, Russia pulled out of the CFE Joint Consultative Group. Talks on tactical nuclear weapons never began.

The 2015 conference on the NPT resulted in failure. North Korea, which withdrew from the NPT back in 2003, continues to test nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The new U.S. administration and Congress are against the 2015 multilateral agreement on limiting the Iranian nuclear program, which might strike a decisive blow to the NPT. Further proliferation of nuclear weapons would mostly occur along Russia's borders: in Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Japan. Ultimately, this will result in nuclear arms inevitably ending up with terrorists, meaning a catastrophe for civilization as we know it.

There are multiple reasons for the emergence of this dangerous situation. The traditional

concept of nuclear arms control was based on the pronounced bipolarity of the world order, the approximate balance of the adversaries' forces, and a rather simple delimitation and approval of classes and types of weapons as a subject of negotiations. Today the world order has become multipolar, the balance of forces is asymmetric, and the advent of new technologies is blurring the erstwhile lines between nuclear and conventional systems, offensive and defensive weapons, and regional and global arms.

The unprecedented improvement in the relations between the USSR/Russia and the West following the end of the Cold War made it possible to take major steps toward disarmament. However, the positive breakthroughs of 1987–1997 were followed by a period during which the nuclear reduction process has been shifting to the margins of the international security agenda as new global and regional power centers emerged in the international arena and alternative issues and threats took precedence. Nuclear arms reduction has played a much smaller role in U.S.–Russia relations since the early 2000s than it did before.

The final blow to the nuclear arms control system was dealt by a sharp about-turn of global politics after Russia, in 2012, said it would no longer put up with the unequal model of relations with the West and the United States' dominance. As Russia's GDP did not exceed 2% of the gross world product at the time, Moscow focused on other factors of its international status. In particular, the role of nuclear weapons was strongly emphasized. In his 2012 article during the presidential campaign, incumbent President Vladimir Putin stressed: "We will not give up our strategic deterrence potential under any circumstances; on the contrary, we will strengthen it."¹⁰ Russia launched a massive nuclear rearmament program (which included the deployment of 400 ballistic missiles)¹¹. After 2010, arms control was becoming an increasingly unpopular topic in Russia, with the existing international treaties more and more often labelled as nothing short of acts betraying the nation¹². Then the Ukrainian crisis hit in 2013. In 2014 Russia incorporated Crimea, and the war in Donbass erupted. In 2015, Moscow launched a large-scale military operation in Syria.

The United States and its allies imposed economic sanctions against Russia and revived the strategy of isolation and containment aimed against Moscow. A fierce propaganda fight broke out, augmented by hacker sabotage operations. We have witnessed a return of intensive military confrontation between Russia on the one hand and the United States and NATO on the in Eastern Europe, the Baltic and Black Sea regions, the Arctic and the Asia-Pacific region. The possibility of an armed conflict between Russia and NATO, including with the use of nuclear weapons, is once again threatening Europe and the rest of the world.

¹⁰ Putin, V. V. *Being Strong is the Guarantee of National Security for Russia* // *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. February 20, 2012. (<http://www.rg.ru/2012/02/20/putin-armiya.html>).

¹¹ Putin, V. V. *Ibid.*

¹² K. Sivkov. *Disarmed and Extremely Dangerous*. *Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier*. No.11, March 22–28, 2017, pp.1–4.

5. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

Overcoming these dangerous trends will only be possible if decisive steps are taken to de-escalate tensions between Russia and the West, including measures to preserve the nuclear arms control regimes. Following the arrival of the new U.S. administration in 2016, the only country capable of doing this is Russia, and then only if it really wishes to do so, which remains unclear. It should be noted, however, that neither the United States, nor China, nor NATO/EU can be expected to be forthcoming. As things stand, Moscow should be the most interested actor here in terms of national security. Seeing as the United States is expected to leap forward in the arms race, it would be in Russia's best interests to lower the ceiling for strategic weapons, including limits for hypersonic platforms, and return to talks on the parameters and confidence-building measures regarding missile defense systems. Another reason is that Russia is in a more vulnerable geostrategic position than the United States and NATO; it has no nuclear allies and does not have many trusted political and military allies overall. The coming military competition would require enormous costs at a time when the Russian economy is not up to the task.

The most important task is to rescue the INF Treaty. Rather than exchanging accusations in vain, the sides should work together to devise additional verification measures to eliminate suspicions on both sides. This should be followed by the signing of the next START Treaty that would cover the period after 2021. Based on these achievements the sides should reach agreement on measures related to missile defense systems and new conventional strategic weapons. After that, Russia, the United States and other countries should resume cooperation on the nuclear security of facilities and materials. In parallel, the NPT and the missile technology control regime should be strengthened. This could be followed by gradual and selective measures toward multilateral nuclear disarmament.

Thus, disarmament, above all nuclear disarmament, is not a utopian dream but rather an imperative of the present day — provided that our civilization as we know it wants to survive. Wilson's dream was in large part made a reality by a number of historic breakthroughs made in the period from 1963 to 1991, with even more breakthroughs coming in 1991–2010. But little has changed in international politics. If anything, in the 2010s it has tumbled all the way back to the Cold War era, perhaps even further. Coupled with the rapid military-technical development, this has resulted in the current crisis and disintegration of the long-established disarmament system.

A nuclear-free world is not the present world minus nuclear weapons, but rather a world that has a different security system, the one that rests upon the strict legal basis for the use of force, that strictly limits conventional armed forces and armaments on new physical principles. It is for the next generation of politicians and experts to build such a world.



SERGEY **UTKIN**

ASSOCIATION
OF NATIONS

Although Woodrow Wilson's theses were not the first appeal to the topic of an international organization that would guarantee the rights of its member states, they did launch a movement toward implementing the idea globally. The grand design immediately encountered opposition in the United States, where the Senate refused to participate in the League of Nations. Since then, international structures designed to promote the maintenance of peace and security have been subjected to pejorative criticism for their weakness and inefficiency. Nevertheless, in most cases, the balance of merits and shortcomings of multilateral mechanisms merely reflects the established correlation of interests between the participating states. The very fact that sovereign countries agreed that it was necessary to have a forum where they would periodically have to listen to criticisms of their actions and policies, accept the diversity of opinions and agree on joint actions, is a significant step forward in comparison with previous centuries.

The philosophical basis for the organized association of peoples was formed by ideas such as eternal peace, European unity and pacifism, which were deliberated by various thinkers and especially actively discussed in the 18th and 19th centuries. Even though the scope of international organizations would later begin to encompass a broad range of social spheres, the logic of the thinkers of the past was mostly concerned with preventing war. If war is used to determine the strongest party in international disputes, then a mechanism needs to be created that would allow for such disputes to be settled without the use of violence.

In a time when the enormous developmental gap between the West and the rest of the world resulted in the creation of colonial empires, there was little difference between the ideas of uniting Europe and uniting nations globally. Even in the 20th century, the West played a central role both in the two world wars and in creating mechanisms of international cooperation. The global significance of other regions did not start to manifest itself until the current generation, and it is likely to continue in the future.

The common desire to create a less anarchic and more civilized international environment resulted, over time, in the establishment of international structures that vary in scale and profile. The oldest structures — industrial and humani-

tarian — emerged prior to Wilson, in the 19th century. It was also before Wilson that the first attempts were made to strengthen and develop the system of international law, to a large degree thanks to Russian initiatives of the late 19th – early 20th century century and the work of Russian lawyer Friedrich Martens. The gradual formation of the most unified regional association of nations in the course of the European integration process was only made possible due to the dramatic weakening of its key participants as a result of the Second World War, which put an end to the grand power ambitions of the past. In all the regions of the world, countries are now pursuing the development of somewhat less ambitious integration initiatives. Still, sovereign states are often tempted, equipped and motivated to make and implement decisions without first consulting their partners in multilateral structures.

International organizations are criticized for their excessive red tape, which can rarely be avoided by an institution dealing with issues that concern the lives of many. Excessive bureaucratization means not just additional costs but often also a loss of speed, which is crucial to international processes as prompt reaction can help shape the course of events. Yet, the crucial task of multilateral structures is to help their member states find a balance of their interests, rather than preventing them from doing so. In choosing between a mechanism's speed and its capacity for reconciling the different parties' interests, it is often the latter that needs to be selected, otherwise the given intergovernmental organization will simply not be able to function. Even for an integration grouping that enjoys greater unity and boasts supranational institutions, challenging the position of some of its members may be rare and unsafe. International organizations, at least during the current historical moment, do not evolve into super-states with their coercive apparatus and a monopoly on violence. They resemble meetings of free citizens of the global polis. Some groups of citizens find it easier to reach a consensus among themselves. Others do not fare as well. And the most difficult part is when they all come together. This is exactly the ambition of the global organization.

The creation of the United Nations was informed by the experience of the League of Nations. More important, however, was the trauma caused by the destructive Second World War, which took place just 20 years after the First World War. The 20th century was marked by the unprecedented growth in the deadly force of weapons. From philosophical theorization, the desire to avoid a global war in the future turned into the key concern of the leading global powers, which needed to secure conditions for their own reconstruction and development.

The structure of the United Nations has not undergone any essential changes in over 70 years, which is a significant period when compared to the lifespan of a human being. The necessity to reform the organization is, quite naturally, discussed from time to time. However, it is in the common interest of all countries to avoid a situation similar to the one that gave rise to the United Nations in the first place. The imperfections of the organization

are insignificant in comparison with the hypothetical global catastrophe that could necessitate the creation of another such mechanism. In addition, the United Nations could, to some extent, be reformed by gradually optimizing the performance of the Secretariat, allocating necessary financial and human resources and, most importantly, developing a deeper understanding among the member states of their responsibility for the future of the world.

In a state, the operation of laws is enforced both by public consensus determining the fundamental rules of community and by the threat of punishment for violations. It is extremely difficult to establish such a system at the global level, especially with regard to the permanent members of the UN Security Council, which themselves must guarantee the operation of generally accepted rules, and also with regard to the allies of any of the five permanent members.

None of the permanent members will surrender their right to veto, and even if they did, it would hardly be a panacea for peace. The composition of the permanent members, which emerged in 1945, may seem suboptimal and in need of expansion, but it is still possible to achieve a sufficiently high level of mutual understanding between the permanent members, both in theory and in practice: despite some serious contradictions, the Security Council has managed to make decisions on many important international issues. Expanding the Security Council would not necessarily make the process easier.

In the post-war world, European countries (even the United Kingdom and France, which are nuclear powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council) take a back seat when it comes to military security. What is truly important to the world's future is how the United States and China, both permanent Security Council members and the key global players in both the economic and military spheres, will get along. Russia remains in between: while retaining its military potential, it lags behind economically. Not only in the Asia-Pacific, where the United States, China and Russia are represented geographically but also elsewhere in the world there are still risks of interstate conflicts as well as intrastate ones that may draw in external actors. It appears that even 70 years after the inception of the Security Council, the importance of interaction among its permanent members remains very high.

Not much improvement can be made to the platform for dialogue: ideal procedural rules, a competent secretariat and cosy chairs do not make up for a lack of goodwill and the absence of the desire to seek compromise solutions. Still, the United Nations' permanence and the decades-long sustainability of its procedures create a tradition, habit of dialogue. A wide network of specialized organizations has been established for the purpose of ensuring a continuous dialogue and implementing projects on issues of global importance, from healthcare to helping refugees. The very possibility of transferring the discussion of a burning issue to the United Nations is an additional safety valve that helps reduce the risk of open conflict. Sometimes this valve works, other times it malfunctions.

In the international community, the temptation to resort to mutual accusations is great. Heated arguments are used to defend positions that often support the narrow interests of ruling groups in individual countries. Multilateral forums present a convenient opportunity to throw accusations at each other while emphasizing the infallibility and adamancy of one's own position. The list of issues on which the key actors regularly get involved in verbal battles is not unlimited, though. There is a high degree of consensus on an important set of topics, including the Sustainable Development Goals formulated within the United Nations. At least nominally, these topics serve as a space where member states work together constructively.

Too often, consensus-based topics are good news that fail to draw the attention of media giants, which would rather report on a sensational disaster even if it is a tempest in a teapot. However, the media environment will change as people do. A more educated consumer who chooses his or her own content, pursues professional interests and communicates with colleagues from different continents, gradually begins to see through the cheap media tricks and unsophisticated rhetorical battles. Shifts in public sentiment will not happen overnight, but if countries of the world manage to refrain from getting involved in new global conflicts, then a qualitatively new global civic association of nations is quite possible.

The world of 1918 was characterized by rapid industrial progress, and huge numbers of illiterate people who were just beginning to acquire a taste for the most primitive participation in social life. That world would soon suffer another catastrophe, then a split into two rivalling economic and ideological models followed by an arms race and a series of regional conflicts. The world of 2018 is qualitatively more stable, wealthier, and better educated. It is a world of uninterrupted high-speed communications and the global economy. These things hold the whole together better than any intergovernmental organization possibly could. These fundamental changes are often overshadowed by lingering, and often rather painful, conflicts in the remaining hotspots and other vicissitudes of the political situation; people tend to perceive these changes as conditions rather than the essence. In reality, the changing environment is shaping the individuals and states of the future, those citizens of the global polis on whom the world's stability and success will depend.

A significantly strengthened Security Council acting as a police force that sends troops to different parts of the world can hardly guarantee international security in the 21st century. Rather, we can expect a further general decrease of the international propensity toward conflict driven by countries' interest in being active participants in a stable global economy and the availability of sufficient opportunities for resolving political disputes through negotiations. It is not so much the United Nations as nations themselves that will undergo reforms, as they adjust their understanding of their place and role in the global world.



IVAN TIMOFEEV

**AN IRON FIST IN
A VELVET GLOVE:**
THE PRINCIPLES
THAT DEFINED THE
AMERICAN AGE

In 1918, President of the United States Woodrow Wilson presented a draft peace treaty to Congress aimed at putting an end to four years of bloodshed caused by the First World War. The document differed from the spirit and principles of the peace accords concluded in the history of international relations. Previous peace agreements would normally enumerate the conditions to be met by the sides in order to end the war. At the same time, every peace treaty was perceived as a respite, which was to be replaced, sooner or later, by another war. Europe and the West in general perceived war as an inevitable evil: allies could turn on one another overnight, but each conflict would inevitably end in a truce, until the next war.

This cycle had perpetuated in Europe for centuries. Any peace treaty, and the very paradigm of diplomacy, implied bargaining, maximizing the benefits of war or minimizing its damage, but not a fight on war itself. In this sense, Wilson's Fourteen Points stood out in that they set forth the founding principles of international relations that were supposed to put an end to war as a phenomenon, making it impossible. The most important principles were: abandoning secret diplomacy; reducing arms; emphasizing interests of societies in resolving international disputes; creating a supranational institution that was capable of playing the role of sovereign in the international arena; stopping the war of all against all; and guaranteeing the sovereignty of all states, regardless of their power and capacity.

Wilson's project, as well as his 1917 idea of peace without victory, both of which were eagerly embraced by Congress, met with outward scepticism in Europe. This attitude was summed up by French writer Anatole France: "A peace without victory is bread without leaven, jugged hare without wine, mullet without capers, cèpes without garlic, love without quarrels, a camel without a hump, night without a moon, a chimney without smoke, a town without a brothel, pork without salt, a pearl without a hole, a rose without scent, a republic without dilapidations, a leg of mutton without a knuckle, a cat without fur, chitterlings without mustard — in a word, 'tis an insipid thing. Is it possible when there are so many sorts of peace to choose from, those Socialists, with such an abundant assortment before them, should go and put their hands on

a peace without victory, a ramshackle peace, to employ your own original and powerful expression? Nay, what do I say, not even a limping, halting, hobbling peace, but a legless peace which will go and squat one buttock on each party, a disgusting, foetid, ignominious, excrementitious, fistulous, hemorrhoidal peace, or in one single word, a peace without victory.”¹³ The Entente leaders — Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George and Vittorio Emanuele Orlando did not hide their irritation with Wilson’s ideas. Their position could be understood: having sacrificed millions of their citizens in the First World War, they were hardly inclined to end it all in the spirit of peace-making idealism, all the more so that the Russian Emperor Nicholas II, one of the most prominent peacemakers of the early 20th century, had been cynically executed by the Bolsheviks and his country was being ravaged by civil war. Wilson’s principles were in tune with the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 initiated by Nicholas II, which had failed to save Europe and Russia from war. The European scepticism was also based on the suspicion that Wilson’s ideas primarily benefited the United States, especially with regard to free trade. As a result, the text of the Treaty of Versailles significantly differed from the Fourteen Points, and the United States Congress blocked the country’s accession to the League of Nations, the fundamental international institution set up after First World War and largely reflected Wilson’s ideology.

A little over 20 years later, a new world war broke out. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, two military-political blocs were on the brink of mutual annihilation. The realists and conservatives, who criticized Wilson and were convinced that a new war was inevitable, could now celebrate the victory of their worldview. However, in the hundred years since the publication of Wilson’s principles, attempts are still made to put war under control. This concerns, in particular, free trade, global governance institutions and arms reduction. In this respect, the world managed to achieve significant results: unprecedented globalization, the surprising vitality of the United Nations (albeit with a very limited mandate), the practices of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and the precedents of large-scale elimination of entire classes of weapons. Nevertheless, in the age of information technology, the freedom of communication and informational transparency of borders, the world is once again balancing on a tightrope. The anarchy of international relations has not disappeared, the number of conflicts is growing, the United Nations is falling apart, arsenals are replenished regularly, arms control regimes are breaking down, defense spending is growing and witch hunts are being carried out. The spirit of the age once again brings preventing war on the agenda. Wilson’s heritage is no less relevant today than it was a century ago.

Let us try to analyze the political philosophy of the Fourteen Points. Wilson’s text is more than just a list of conditions. Its author, one of the few intellectuals among the presidents of the United States, was well versed in political theory and embedded much deeper meaning in his points than merely an opportunistic desire to achieve a beneficial peace. Wilson’s

¹³ *Cit. ex. Stone, O., Kuznick, P. The Untold Story of the United States. Moscow. Kolibri, 2015, p. 48.*

project is based on a deep intellectual tradition that goes back to the political philosophy of the Enlightenment in the 18th century, and reflects a system of liberal approaches to the transformation of international relations.

At the heart of the liberal tradition is the belief in the human mind's unlimited ability to transform social reality. Rationality is a key cure for social ailments; it creates an orderly society based on a rational legal system in which each individual has the opportunity for self-realization. Reason and law, which are embodied in the social contract and the state system, are contrasted with the Hobbesian anarchy and the war of all against all. The social contract implements justice, an opportunity for everyone to be free while at the same time being equal to others before the law. Justice is guaranteed by the sovereign state acting on behalf of the nation like a rational clockwork mechanism.

Liberals extrapolate this interpretation to international relations. Wilson stands on the shoulders of William Penn, Charles-Irenee Castel de Saint-Pierre, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant. According to the liberals, if anarchy and the war of all against all can be taken under control within a state, then this can be done in international relations. This requires rational international laws and a supranational body to act as the sovereign and force states to comply with international standards. The case could also be helped by what is now known as democratization: there are far fewer incentives for war in countries where the people are able to influence the authorities, because societies usually have no interest in the scourge of war, which is unleashed by the elites. Finally, free trade must put an end to wars, as the rationality of trade and economic interdependence outweighs the irrationality of war.

Liberal idealism was criticized by everyone. Socialists accused Wilson of hypocrisy and attempting to impose the interests of the exploiting classes on the world. Conservatives found fault with the excessive arrogance displayed in the principles and their author's belief in the boundless possibilities of the human mind. The main critic, however, proved the harsh reality of the 20th century itself. This was especially true of the fourth point, which postulated the reduction of arsenals to a reasonable minimum. Within a relatively short historical period, humanity made a genuine breakthrough in its ability to achieve mutual destruction.

Wilson's doctrine fell into the trap of man's dual nature proposed by Augustine of Hippo. Man's divine nature was more than offset by its devious nature, with its irresistible passion for destruction. Reinhold Niebuhr, one of the greatest critics of liberalism in international relations, would subsequently strengthen this thesis, pointing out that the depravity of the human nature was multiplied out of proportion in organized communities such as states. Therefore, only the fear of mutual destruction and unacceptable damage can stop aggression. In the war of all against all, deterrence of the devil requires another devil, and one has to choose the lesser of two evils (which, in the situation with the USSR, was the

United States). Fear and uncertainty are the locomotives of international relations. They cannot be controlled by rational means. Humanity is doomed to face the security dilemma and follow the spiral of fear (these concepts emerged after Second World War). Consequently, foreign policy requires more wisdom and experience than reason and rationality.

Still, Wilson was hardly a naïve idealist. For America, his principles proved to be a winning strategy. Every implementation of the key points inevitably played into Washington's hands, strengthening its role as a global leader. The freedom of navigation, backed by the most powerful navy in the world, turned the United States into the master of the seas. The elimination of economic barriers led to the expansion of American capital, and subsequently to the creation of a U.S.-centric financial system, which has been working and flourishing ever since. Most global companies are American. Financial sanctions imposed by the United States are possible and effective due to the dominance of the dollar. Globalization has brought dividends to many countries, increasing the attractiveness of the American project in their eyes. Reduced arms (in particular, the reduction in the number of battleships) after the First World War was masterfully replaced by new types of weapons (such as aircraft carriers). During the Cold War, the U.S. managed to sign beneficial agreements with the USSR on reducing nuclear and conventional weapons. Reducing conventional weapons eliminated Soviet supremacy in this area, while cutting the number of nuclear missiles reduced the potential of the only state capable of wiping the United States off the face of the Earth. The U.S. managed to turn the principle of sovereign equality to their benefit. This was especially true of the freedom of choice of military alliances. In the post-Soviet period, this principle has been at the heart of NATO's expansion.

Finally, and most importantly, liberal slogans promoting freedom and progress have turned into a powerful tool of soft power determining America's moral leadership. Realists, conservatives, and other critics were strong and popular in the United States throughout the 20th century, and they are still influential today. However, this did not prevent the U.S. from using liberalism as an effective ideological tool of their foreign policy. The ideological component played a decisive role in the United States' victory over the USSR. The most powerful military power in the world fell without a single shot being fired toward U.S. positions.

The centennial of Wilson's principles is a good occasion for the United States to revise its foreign policy, which obviously needs to be adapted to the rapidly changing conditions. Russia, for its part, needs to draw conclusions from the mistakes and successes of the U.S., which in the 20th century managed to achieve an optimal combination of advancing their national interest and promoting its values around the world.



OLEG DEMIDOV

**WOODROW WILSON'S
FOURTEEN POINTS**
IN THE INFORMATION
AGE

Woodrow Wilson was one of the most significant idealists of his generation. Furthermore, he projected his idealism onto the people that had vested him with the nation's executive power. "Sometimes people call me an idealist," he said in a speech in Sioux Falls, South Dakota on September 8, 1919. "Well, that is the way I know I am an American. America is the only idealistic nation in the world." The most amazing thing is that Wilson who was hardly young offered this a year after the end of the First World War, in the middle of his second term in office, during a time when idealism seemed to be simply unacceptable, both in the light of his personal experience and in the context of external circumstances.

Indeed, many of the 28th U.S. President's foreign policy initiatives would fail, eventually. The League of Nations could not keep Europe and the world from engaging in a new global military conflict. And many of the Fourteen Points outlined for the distant future remained mostly on paper. However, the main and most urgent task — to find an appropriate peace format that would put an end to the horrendously massive and destructive war — was indeed met. Later on (and without Wilson), the United States would indeed become the world's main idealist: the primary supplier, sponsor and defender of democratic ideas, with Communist Soviet Union as its opponent. The main question today is whether we can draw from, and replicate, the success of Wilson's Fourteen Points.

The main difference between the world that President Wilson knew and the world that we know today is not about the development of information technology per se, but rather about the way in which the IT-shaped global environment has blurred the borderlines and the very landscape of international relations. The current status of cyberspace is much closer to Leo Trotsky's paradoxical and chaotic formula of "neither war nor peace" than it is to the Roman precision of Wilson's Fourteen Points. An official declaration of war is now but a thing of the past: state-run cyber corporations do not obey either the Geneva Convention or any other articles of international law. Widespread cyberespionage, constant probing attacks against critical infrastructure, intentional backdoors left in strategic systems, and the hacking of government databases

have become routine. They never cross the threshold of an armed assault, so they never trigger the war alarm when it comes to international interaction. More than that, the adversary stays anonymous thanks to mediating actors and the intermediate infrastructure of cyber operations. War of annihilation no longer exists as a concept. Yet we do not live in a state of peace either: constant pinprick attacks are causing ever greater damage to governments and the private sector, undermining mutual trust within the system of international relations and threatening uncontrolled escalation. Successful cyber-physical attacks are fraught with risks of a massive manmade disaster.

The situation is complicated by the uncontrolled increase in the scale and frequency of media campaigns, online propaganda and counterpropaganda, and the booming industry of fake news and media components of the so-called hybrid warfare, seemingly following the principle of all against all. All these instruments used to be primarily the components of the military toolkit and fitted into the rigid theory of Psychological Operations (PSYOP). Now that the genie has been let out of the bottle, the online propaganda and misinformation mechanisms are available to all and sundry.

What could Wilson the Idealist possibly offer to a world like this? Or, to be more exact, how could we possibly adjust the Fourteen Points while at the same time preserving and adapting their spirit in a world where physical boundaries are counterbalanced by global communication networks, where the line between war and peace has been almost completely blurred, and where international actors are operating in a strange mode of conflict cooperation with each other?

In this sense, we should look at Wilson's universal points, namely One through Five, and also at Point Fourteen, which propose the general principles underlying a post-war system of international relations, rather than points Six through Thirteen, which are specifically devoted to the establishment of preconditions for peace in the individual countries that were involved in First World War. Point Two declared "absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war." Today, the issue of freedom, openness and equal access for all is no less pressing with regard to the new artificial medium known as cyberspace. The desire of the leading powers to control their cyberspace segments, not just at the level of physical infrastructure, but also on the level of data flows, is becoming more apparent. Arguments in favor of developing national cyberspace segments and protecting them against external threats, which were once typical of China, are now often found in bills and public statements of politicians in Russia, the Middle East and Asia Pacific. The industry is increasingly discussing the development of sovereign digital economies and, consequentially, the fragmentation of the global digital space, including the internet.

This process appears to be irreversible. There are enough external threats, from state-run cyber operations and cross-border cybercrime to corporate cyberespionage and fake news

campaigns. The damage from such threats is very real — suffice it to recall that the recent WannaCry and NotPetya hacker attacks caused billions of dollars in losses. For governments themselves, the temptation to take control over their respective IT sectors and the digital economy is too high, because this sphere is seeing the inflow of investment and intellectual capital; it is the birthplace of key innovations and the host of digital processes that increasingly affect the overall dynamics of economic development.

Paradoxically, however, all this will only continue to work for as long as the global digital economy and digital market maintain at least some semblance of unity, and for as long as they are open to most of the world's population, irrespective of their nationality and the region in which they live. It will continue to work for as long as the internet remains freely accessible from virtually anywhere in the world to anyone physically capable of using it. This is the only way for any internet user to get access to virtually unlimited opportunities in terms of labour, education, communication and research, and for the global economy to remain truly global, exceeding the sum total of its national segments. Such a vision for a globalized digital world is pure idealism, which permeates the outwardly naïve 2000 Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society. Today's wave of digital globalization seems to be receding, revealing the old concepts of nation states, jurisdictions and geographic boundaries which have now been taken to cyberspace. This presents a suitable context for the idealistic thesis on the preservation of unity and the inadmissibility of barriers in the digital domain — a thesis aimed at the future despite the realities of today. Such a thesis is fairly Wilsonian.

The same philosophy applies to Point Three, which calls for the removal of all economic barriers and the establishment of equal trade conditions for all nations. Today, this thesis additionally involves the removal of barriers with regard to online intellectual property, and also the development and adoption by the private sector, governments and international organizations of compatible technical standards for further development of IT infrastructure and digital services. The goal here is not merely to secure profits for IT corporations, but also to improve the quality of people's lives, optimize business processes and speed up economic growth thanks to new opportunities such as services based on cross-machine communication and the Internet of Things (IoT), which is used in different sectors, from medicine and state administration to industry and agriculture. Common compatible standards for long-range wireless communications in smart devices are the necessary foundation for introducing IoT services where the economy and people need them. The same principle applies to the development of an international copyright standard, the promotion of free knowledge based on open licences, etc.

The most applicable of Wilson's points today is Point Four, which calls for adequate guarantees that national armaments will be reduced "to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." The necessity of limiting the development and use of cyber weapons has existed for around 20 years now at the national level, but no tangible results have been

reached so far in the form of at least agreed and adopted international standards. Wilson did not live to see the confrontation of nuclear superpowers and the development of the fundamental principles of mutual deterrence and escalation management in international conflicts. Nevertheless, all of his Fourteen Points were aimed at creating a system of standards, guarantees and other mechanisms that would help keep states from unleashing a new military conflict.


Limiting arms and, separately, limiting the list of legitimate targets is part and parcel of such a system, one that is in high demand with regard to cyberspace and critical infrastructure today. The new Point Four could involve talks on a list of facilities on which governments would pledge not to carry out cyberattacks or any other IT attacks that could result in human casualties, massive infrastructural destruction or serious damage to the international community, third countries and their citizens. Such a list could involve strategic military IT systems, nuclear facilities, dams and reservoirs (i.e. installations containing dangerous forces, according to the terminology of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949), as well as global distributed systems that provide critical services to people and organizations all over the world, such as global interbank payment systems and the internet infrastructure (DNS root servers and numbering resources databases). Possible guarantees against the proliferation of cyber weapons might apply to weaponized software. Additionally, members of the international community could undertake to restrict information operations and online propaganda campaigns.

Finally, the next logical step would be to strengthen the international regime aimed at restricting the military use of cyberspace. This could be done by way of setting up an intergovernmental organization involving private and non-government members, one that would act as the secretariat and oversight agency. This League of Nations 2.0, adapted to the hi-tech hybrid challenges to international stability and peace, could be set up as part of the United Nations, provided that the latter is subjected to reforms and modernization first. What is needed are not expert working groups, but a permanent secretariat, with its staff and material resources, not unlike the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The organization would also need to have powers to oversee the implementation of the obligations undertaken by states to restrict the development and use of cyber weapons. This is the most idealistic, and even utopian, point of the fourteen proposed by Wilson: just like the original League of Nations, it is unlikely to be a success in modern conditions, but any worthy idea must at least be tried (even if, just like in the last century, not immediately).

The only necessary condition that really contradicts both Wilson's views and the message of his initial Fourteen Points is the state-centered view of the system of international relations. One hundred years ago, the 28th President of the United States believed that, in the future, governments would be much more involved in solving issues that had previously been dealt with by other actors — corporations, influential individuals, etc. Today, one may argue that Wilson's wish is being realized in cyberspace: the role of states in regulating IT

and its use is as prominent as never before and is further expanding. And on the contrary, the approach involving all different stakeholders (multi-stakeholder approach), which was the basis for policies governing internet infrastructure, goes through a crisis and is more and more often put into question. Would such a state of things satisfy Wilson's aspirations? To a certain extent yes, but more likely than not the liberal-minded president would deem it crucial to maintain balance between governments and other actors — for instance, private sector and technical community, without whom there would be no global internet, nor IT industry in its current form.







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